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The evolution of socially connected networks of influence has created new 
ideological dimensions that motivate an individual to radicalize and to commit acts of 
violent extremism and terrorism. This thesis explored the viability of using social 
network analysis (SNA) as a tool in the nation’s Threat and Hazard Identification Risk 
Assessment (THIRA) framework to determine whether factors (such as relationships and 
motivations) can be used to reduce the vulnerability of a community at risk of 
radicalization and violent extremism and to build resilience. Using literature that 
described core SNA principles and related fields of study, a theoretical framework was 
developed to illustrate how extremist ideologies and motivations are socialized within a 
particular network. This theoretical framework is assessed through a multi-case study 
analysis, examining an individual’s radicalization process and programs to counter 
violent extremism in Australia and Scotland. This analysis ultimately suggested that 
incorporating the SNA methodology could be beneficial if included in the THIRA 
process. This thesis illustrates how a community could be provided the opportunity to 
mitigate against the process of radicalization by developing and targeting core 
capabilities that may help them build social capital and trust and to increase efficiency 
and availability of information sharing and social support intended to improve individual 
and community resilience. 
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Since the September 11 attacks, the United States alone has experienced a 
significant increase in violent extremist attacks motivated through social networks. In this 
environment of social complexity, we see differences in communities at risk to this 
threat.  
This thesis takes a new approach and examines the concept of Social Network 
Analysis (SNA) to determine whether a community’s vulnerability can be reduced 
through incorporating the SNA methodology into the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency’s Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) process. The 
assertion is that 1) there is a gap in counter radicalization and violent extremism studies 
and policies with regard to assessing a community’s vulnerability through an analysis of 
their social networks; 2) there should be a way to qualitatively and quantitatively measure 
the interpersonal relationships of violent extremists and at-risk communities by 
incorporating SNA in the THIRA process; and 3) that SNA can be used or acknowledged 
in homeland security organizations’ prevention assessment tools and methods for pre-
empting radicalization and violence. Therefore, these questions are studied. 
This research uses a multiple case study approach to answer these questions. 
Using literature that describes core SNA principles and related fields of study, a 
theoretical framework was developed to illustrate how extremist ideologies and 
motivations are socialized within a particular network. 
Using multi-case analysis, a theoretical framework is refined to include social 
network factors affecting a community’s vulnerability of radicalization and violent 
extremism. The findings of the case studies allowed for the development of a theoretical 
framework illustrating how the SNA methodology can be incorporated into the THIRA 
process to not only mitigate against the process of radicalization, but to also build 
stronger social networks and a community’s resilience in preventing violent extremism 
and terrorism. 
 xvi 
The goal of the new assessment framework is threefold: to identify communities 
lacking relevant social network information that would contribute to social outreach; to 
enhance trust between government and communities to foster cooperation and 
partnerships; and to link the right expertise, skills, and resources to help at-risk 
communities increase the number of proficient stakeholders and fora in which 
community members can work safely with their government to develop targeted support 
strategies. This framework is intended to support a new homeland security strategy to 
identify and assess the vulnerability of communities through an analysis of their social 
networks. In doing so, a determination can be made of which actors and relationships best 
lend themselves to opportunities for the government to develop, deliver, and sustain 
efforts for preventing the root causes of extremist ideologies.  
To realize the new THIRA model, support would be needed to create a unified, 
national countering violent extremism (CVE) framework that looks at the spread of 
ideology and its impacts, which is distinct from imminent threats of terrorism and its 
intersection with law enforcement. Because communications from violent extremists are 
more ubiquitous than ever before, every state and community must be prepared to address 
the challenge of radicalization and violent extremism. While the cases studied in this 
thesis provide some examples of effective programs, at least one U.S. community would 
need to take the lead as a pilot program in testing SNA in the THIRA process. Successful 
implementation of an experimental case, particularly with a state or community with 
prior experience in conducting a THIRA, could make the case for national expansion, and 
ultimately initiate an addendum to the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201 that 
outlines the four-step process for accountability of the threat and risk assessment 
framework. Such findings would address the need to align federal government efforts 
with individual cities and towns to establish a nationwide approach to CVE.  
The United States has already seen that predicting radicalization is difficult, and 
efforts to disrupt the process are not always successful. While tactical approaches have 
thus far been largely effective, they usually rely on identifying a threat just before it is 
carried out. Because the knowledge of someone who may have already been radicalized 
to commit violence is inherently limited, this approach may not always be successful. 
 xvii 
However, by developing a strategy that prevents an individual’s trajectory toward 
radicalization while it is still in early stages of development, homeland security and 
intelligence officials may be more effective in reducing a community’s overall 
vulnerability and increasing its resilience. A focus on social networks brings to light areas 
previously unexplored that may improve our fundamental understanding of the 
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One of the most notable challenges of the 21st century is the increasing rise in the 
threat from violent extremism. Since 2009, the United States has experienced a 
remarkable upsurge in the number of attacks as a result of this threat.1 Researchers 
carrying out systematic studies among violent extremists have shown a shift in focus 
from the ideologies associated with why an individual becomes radicalized to the factors 
that enable how they may radicalize.2 Specifically, an individual’s social network, that is, 
ties to family, friends, and acquaintances, has been found to be one of the most influential 
factors impacting the trajectory of an individual’s path to radicalization.3 
Based on how the threat of radicalization has evolved, it is imperative that new 
approaches analyzing and assessing the potential threat of violent extremism evolve as 
well. In congressional testimony, University of Michigan professor Scott Atran stated 
that the United States continues to focus on the technological aspect of countering violent 
extremism (CVE) with “no sustained or systematic approach to field-based social 
understanding of our adversaries’ motivation, intent, will, and dreams that drive their 
strategic vision, however strange those dreams and vision may seem to us.”4 This 
                                                 
1 Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, Countering Violent Extremism in America (Washington, DC: 
Center for Cyber & Homeland Security The George Washington University, 2015), 1. 
2 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” 
Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 14, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.1; John 
Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization 
into Terrorism, “Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (2007): 80–94, 
doi: 10.1177/0002716208317539; Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins, The Radicalization Puzzle: A 
Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism (Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2015), 959. 
3 Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin, ed., Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces 
Together (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 311; Scott Atran, Pathways to and from Violent Extremism 
The Case for Science-based Field Research: Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats & Capabilities (March 10, 2010) (statement of Scott Atran, Director of Research, 
ARTIS Research and Risk Modeling), 3; Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks: Structural Analysis 
in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 27; Randy Borum, “Assessing Risk 
for Terrorism Involvement,” American Psychological Association 2, no. 2 (2015): 63–87, doi: http://dx.doi. 
org/10.1037/tam0000043; Martin Bouchard, Social Networks, Terrorism, and Counterterrorism (New 
York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2015), 78.  
4 Atran, Pathways to and from Violent Extremism The Case for Science-Based Field Research: 
Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats & Capabilities, 4. 
 2 
statement provides the opening for exploring Social Network Analysis (SNA) to assess 
and identify communities at risk and to enhance their resiliency that this thesis offers. 
In this thesis, I explored whether SNA can help homeland security professionals 
prevent or counter violent extremism by better understanding the impact of social 
networks on an individual’s or a community’s path to radicalization. Unlike traditional 
measures, SNA extends beyond assessing personal attributes to evaluating and 
measuring” the behavior of actors (whether individuals, groups, or organizations) 
affected by their ties to others and the networks in which they are embedded.”5 By 
recasting radicalization as a susceptibility or vulnerability primarily enabled by those in a 
person’s social network, I sought to determine whether any signals or warning signs 
preceding radicalization may be used by policymakers in homeland security to anticipate 
and mitigate violent extremism across communities in America. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Researchers who have examined cases of those who “join the jihad” have found 
that 90% of those individuals who do so are primarily influenced by their ties with 
friends and kin.6 In the evaluation of domestic counter violent extremism strategies, 
metrics to determine cause and effect beyond correlation of social ties to radicalization 
and violence have yet to be clearly determined.7 Meanwhile, the United States and 
nations abroad have experienced a rise in terrorist attacks over the last few years, 
compounding the dangers people face from individuals who resort to violence based upon 
ideologies socialized within a particular network. After the attacks on September 11, 
2001, Gallup and Pew surveys indicated that likely 7% of the world’s Muslim 
communities, nearly 100 million people, sympathized with jihadi aspirations.8 This 
                                                 
5 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks: Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences, 5. 
6 Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” 7–36.  
7 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Surveying 
CVE Metrics in Prevention, Disengagement and Deradicalization Programs: Report to the Office of 
University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(College Park, MD: A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence, 
2015), 2. 
8 Atran, Pathways to and from Violent Extremism the Case for Science-Based Field Research: 
Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats & Capabilities, 3. 
 3 
surprising number of sympathizers has created a much higher probability of terrorist 
activity because of increasing numbers of those susceptible to recruitment to jihadi 
movements by those seeking to influence them through ties with family and close 
friends.9 
The purpose of narratives for recruitment to violent Islamist movements has been 
to exploit a multitude of factors. Socioeconomic deprivation, political grievances, and 
religious beliefs have been identified as motivators influencing individuals on the 
pathway to radicalization.10 Anti-Western Salafist interpretations of Islam and calls for 
jihad, anti-Semitism, religious extremism, and anti-Western rhetoric have been common 
themes in narratives that resonate within some populations of Muslims.11 Conditions in 
areas of marginalized communities, such as lack of trust in social networks, weak social 
support, and the social structure of Diaspora populations have also created 
vulnerabilities.12 Consequently, an environment conducive to radicalization can be 
facilitated and promulgated through connections in an individual’s own social networks, 
whether through face-to-face or virtual contact.  
Unlike many countries in the developing world, where people are familiar with 
the ongoing threat of terrorism, those involved in programs for countering domestic 
violent extremism in America have struggled to develop a framework that can adequately 
assess the risk of violent extremist activity.13 In Leaderless Jihad, terrorism expert Marc 
Sageman argued that an optimal approach to understanding terrorism and violent 
extremism is to focus on the dynamics of social networks and how these networks 
                                                 
9 Atran, Pathways to and from Violent Extremism The Case for Science-Based Field Research: 
Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats & Capabilities, 3. 
10 Anna Simons, 21st Century Cultures of War: Advantage Them (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, 2013), 11–15. 
11 Azeem Ibrahim, Tackling Muslim Radicalization: Lessons from Scotland (Washington, DC: 
Institute for Social Policy & Understanding, 2010), 1, http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/ispu%20-%20radicalization 
%20report.pdf. 
12 University of Maryland National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, Community-Level Indicators of Radicalization: A Data and Methods Task Force, Report to 
Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (College Park, MD: University of Maryland National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2010), 7. 
13 Vidino and Hughes, Countering Violent Extremism in America, 10. 
 4 
influence the behavior of people who become terrorists.14 Martin Bouchard’s Social 
Networks, Terrorism, and Counterterrorism also asserted that an understanding of a 
person’s social ties are most important when at key moments changes in relationships 
may lead to reversing their decision to support violent extremist beliefs.15 To achieve 
such understanding, it is necessary to research, analyze, and draw conclusions as to how 
the theory of social networks affects the critical pathways to radicalization and the 
challenges faced by the relationship connections within an individual’s and community’s 
social and terrorism prevention support network. 
The study of social networks, much like many general concepts that describe the 
sociopsychology of human behavior, has developed and evolved over time into the 
computational social science field of social network analysis. SNA studies how humans 
organize through social influences and provides a methodology to measure such 
organization.16 Based on the research in this thesis, however, a gap exists in the study of 
SNA applications to anticipating and radicalization and violent extremism.  
The development of a method to recognize and address early signs of 
radicalization warrants further research into the application of SNA and how it can be 
used to reduce an individual’s and a community’s vulnerability to violent extremist 
ideologies and to explore support systems that offset the threat they pose. By taking this 
approach, it may be possible to better anticipate and mitigate recruitment and 
radicalization that propagates through the ties of extremist networks.17 In this thesis, I 
have addressed the gap by examining the potential to integrate SNA methodology into 
the nation’s Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) framework 
for assessing a community’s vulnerability to violent extremism.  
                                                 
14 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the 21st Century (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 137. 
15 Bouchard, Social Networks, Terrorism, and Counterterrorism, 78. 
16 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 4; John Scott and Peter J. Carrington, The SAGE Handbook of 
Social Network Analysis (London: SAGE, 2011), 3.  
17 Ashley Aran et al., “Defining a Strategic Campaign for Working with Partners to Counter and 
Delegitimize Violent Extremism Workshop: A Strategic Multilayer Assessment Project,” paper presented 
at workshop for the U.S. Department of State RAND Corporation JS/J-3/DDGO STRATCOM/GISC 
OSD/DDRE/RRTO, Washington, DC, May 19–20, 2010. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary question I will seek to answer in this thesis is as follows: How can 
SNA reduce the vulnerability of a community at risk from radicalization and violent 
extremism if used within the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) 
THIRA process? 
Other questions include the following:  
• How can SNA be incorporated into the THIRA process to help prevent 
radicalization and violent extremism? 
• In what ways do current homeland security organizations acknowledge or 
use SNA in their prevention assessment tools and methods? 
In this thesis, a theoretical framework was developed to illustrate how the 
relational characteristics of violent extremists in social networks can be used in the 
framework of the THIRA process when analyzing radicalization. The key question in this 
research focused on determining whether the factors (such as relationships and 
motivations) that contribute to the radicalization of an individual, as revealed by 
analyzing their social networks, can be used to determine an individual or a community’s 
vulnerability for preempting radicalization and violence. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
An emerging problem in the United States is the threat posed by individuals either 
inspired or directed by terrorists at home and abroad to commit acts of violence, often 
accomplished through the strong and weak ties of an individual’s social network. Such 
was the case, for instance, in the ideological development and radicalization of Omar 
Hammami, whose trajectory of recruitment and radicalization led him from the small 
Alabama city of Daphne to the battlefields of Somalia, where he joined the ranks of al-
Shabab.18 Analyzing social networks, whether evident or conceptual, can play an integral 
role in efforts to prevent, deradicalize, or disengage persons from acts of jihad or general 
                                                 
18 Bouchard, Social Networks, Terrorism, and Counterterrorism, 65. 
 6 
violence.19 Although an increase has occurred in the use of social network theory and 
methods as an application for implementing counterterrorism measures,20 methods to 
assess the risk of radicalization by leveraging SNA appear to be lacking.21 
Predicting radicalization is difficult because of the absence of clear behavioral 
patterns or pathways, resulting in violent extremism.22 The presence of extremist beliefs 
alone may or may not be evidence enough to warrant an intervention. In some cases, an 
individual may not choose a path to violence until the last days or even hours of an 
impending attack, thereby requiring additional resources to disrupt or foil terrorist plans 
already in place.23 Preemptively incorporating an assessment of social networks of 
interest in a community may help determine characteristics of both vulnerability and 
resilience to radicalization to address susceptible individuals in that community before 
they radicalize.  
SNA techniques and tools are useful to identify the actors and relationships best 
positioned to counter or prevent the spread of violent extremist ideologies.24 This thesis 
was intended to demonstrate that SNA can help policymakers in homeland security 
develop and sustain targeted interventions and engagement strategies that will 
dramatically reduce the risk for individuals and communities vulnerable to violent 
extremism. Finally, in this thesis I propose a SNA framework that could be incorporated 
into FEMA’s THIRA process to enhance the resilience of individuals and communities at 
risk of radicalization and violent extremism.  
                                                 
19 Daniel Aldrich, “First Steps towards Hearts and Minds? USAID’s Countering Violent Extremism 
Policies in Africa,” Global Policy Research Institute (June 2012): 8, doi: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/gpri 
docs/8; Davis and Cragin, Social Science for Counterterrorism, 307. 
20 Vladis E. Krebs, “Uncloaking Terrorist Networks,” First Monday 7, no. 4 (April 1, 2002), 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/941/; Marc Sageman, 
Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 138; Everton, 
Disrupting Dark Networks: Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences. 
21 Bouchard, Social Networks, Terrorism, and Counterterrorism, 65. 
22 Hafez and Mullins, The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to 
Homegrown Extremism, 959. 
23 Bouchard, Social Networks, Terrorism, and Counterterrorism, 65. 
24 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks: Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences, 33. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The evolving focus on the social ties and dynamics that lead individuals to 
become terrorists warrants a thorough evaluation of current literature on the process of 
radicalization. Researchers have attributed radicalization to the emergence of 
relationships within social networks influencing marginalized youth and others who 
reside in communities potentially vulnerable to the ideologies of violent extremists.25 To 
answer the questions posed in this thesis, examining and synthesizing concepts and data 
from several distinct areas of research are necessary.  
This literature review is divided into the following categories: SNA, radicalization 
and violent extremism, assessing risk factors, countering violent extremism, a social 
network approach to preventing violent extremism. The literature on SNA explores its 
origins; from the time it was created to its modern use in several distinct fields, and 
reviews some of the common tenets and concepts that network analysts often use. The 
literature on radicalization and violent extremism discusses the various descriptions of 
radicalization and violent extremism and reasons why the evolving phenomena are yet to 
be consistently understood. Assessing risk factors explores the individual, community, 
and social network risk factors that have been recognized as indicators of individuals and 
communities at risk of radicalization and violent extremism, and how those indicators can 
be used to inform assessments of radicalized violence. The literature in countering violent 
extremism reviews some of the policies, programming, and processes in efforts abroad 
and in the United States for countering violent extremism; discusses the impact those 
efforts can have on communities; and, addresses the gaps in U.S. federal CVE policies 
and programs. Lastly, to make the connection between the literature on SNA and 
radicalization and violent extremism prevention, the last section discusses the important 
role of social networks in preventing an individual from radicalizing and how that can be 
facilitated through the development of strategies that empower bottom-up decision 
making and by strengthening social networks in communities to build resilience. 
                                                 
25 Atran, Pathways to and from Violent Extremism The Case for Science-Based Field Research: 
Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats & Capabilities, 3. 
 8 
A. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS  
The notion that people are ensconced in dense webs of social connections is one 
of the most compelling ideas asserted by social scientists.26 This theoretical assertion 
dates back to the early 1900s, when social scientists investigated the phenomena 
surrounding social order. The idea of integrating formal network theory and the study of 
human relationships emerged into what is known today as social network analysis.  
1. Origins of Social Network Analysis 
The basic theoretical concepts of SNA and its application have evolved through 
several stages of development. Georg Simmel is considered one of the intellectual 
forebearers of SNA for his work in examining the gathering of secret societies. The social 
organization of the societies led to his discovery of patterns inhuman interactions that 
were used in some of his later studies in which he observed social complexity and 
behavior, particularly the rise in individualism.27 His thinking led to the study of 
networks in social systems, which later influenced the development of sociometry in the 
1930s.28 See Figure 1. 
                                                 
26 Stephen Borgatti et al., “Network Analysis in the Social Sciences,” Science 323, no. 5916 (February 
2009): 892–95, doi: 10.1126/science.1165821.  
27 Georg Simmel, “The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies,” American Journal of Sociology 
11 (1906): 441–498. 
28 With the exploration of social network theory, the early formal development of SNA traces back to 
sociometric theorists, notably Jacob Moreno, known as one of the godfathers of SNA. As a result of many 
experiments, Moreno discovered organized patterns in human relationships responsible for shaping social 
influences and ideas, resulting in the way people see and interpret the world. His work led to the 
development of the sociogram, a tool to map and depict the interpersonal structure of small groups; it is 
used universally in much of the contemporary literature studied by social scientists. Jacob Moreno, Who 
Shall Survive? A New Approach to the Problem of Human Interrelations (Washington, DC: Nervous and 
Mental Disease Publishing Co., 1934). 
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Figure 1.  The Beginning of Sociometry: Jacob Moreno’s First Sociogram, 
Mapping the Social Networks of Runaway Girls.29 
Building on early social network theories, social psychologists experimented with 
the design of communication structures to study group processes. They based their 
studies on the idea that an organization’s structure influenced problem-solving decisions 
for groups, as well as the performance of individuals.30 Many social anthropologists 
employed network theory in research studying the phenomena of social interactions.31 In 
1957, John Barnes configured a network from the social structures of communities in a 
Norwegian Island parish.32 The experiment differed from previous studies in that the 
members of a particular society referenced personal relationships, such as those based on 
class.33 Barnes discovered that sharing similar cultural community norms resulted in 
interactions among parish members in an organized manner. As a result, Barnes coined 
                                                 
29 Source: Moreno, Who Shall Survive? A New Approach to the Problem of Human Interrelations. 
30 Linton Freeman, D. Roeder, and R. Mulholland, “Centrality in Social Networks: II. Experimental 
Results,” Social Networks, 2 (1980): 119–141. 
31 Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 56. 
32 John A. Barnes, “Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish,” Human Relations 7, no. 1 
(February 1954): 39–58, doi: 10.1177/001872675400700102. 
33 Ibid. 
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the term social network, defining it as “a system of ties between pairs of persons who 
regard each other as approximate social equals.”34 
Sociological analysis from the 1960 to 1970s involved approaches focusing on the 
attributes of an individual (e.g., gender, race, education) often aided by statistical analysis 
of survey data.35 Sociologist Harrison White believed the focus on individual attributes 
was a mistake, pioneering numerous case studies that led to a focus on the wide-ranging 
patterns of social interaction and the underlying contexts in which they were embedded 
(e.g., residence, place of employment, and community organization).36 
Modern use of SNA serves as a methodology for empirically studying how and 
why humans form networks of relationships and for measuring the structures of such 
networks and their behavior.37 “Designed to explore and empirically capture the patterns 
of ties between people, groups of people, organizations and countries,”38 SNA provides 
the capability to detect and analyze enduring patterns of social ties between actors; it 
differs from other analytical methods, for example, link analysis, which focuses on 
analyzing relational patterns of diverse objects. The basic difference is that SNA offers an 
analyst the means to quantify and measure relationships among like-actors in a network, 
whereas link analysis allows only a comparison of the ties between different types of 
objects.39 
The focus of SNA on social relations and the patterns that emerge from them has 
resonated in a variety of social science and behavioral science disciplines. Its applications 
have been the topic of a number of professional conferences, as well as academic and 
professional journals in fields, such as management consulting, homeland security, and 
                                                 
34 Barnes, “Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish,” 39–58. 
35 Christina Prell, Social Network Analysis: History, Theory & Methodology (London: SAGE 
Publications Ltd., 2011), 8. 
36 Harrison C. White, “Preface: “Catnets” Forty Years Later,” Sociologica (May 2008): 0–0, doi: 
10.2383/26575.  
37 Prell, Social Network Analysis: History, Theory & Methodology, 8. 
38 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks: Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences, 27. 
39 Ibid., 16. 
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public health.40 In addition, the Internet and social media sites have led to increasing 
recognition among commercial interests and social scientists of the importance and 
influence of virtual social networks.41 Modern theorists have described complex social 
networks as interactions among individuals or groups, social or religious gatherings, 
events, online communities, and other connections.42 Interactions within and between 
networks can be motivated by social status, employment position, friendship, love, 
money, power, ideas, even disease.43 Religious groups, community coalitions, tribal and 
familial units, and criminal organizations are all examples of social networks.44 
Violent extremist are members of diverse social networks. They come together 
through ties of ideologies, kinship, friendship, disenfranchisement, personal grievances, 
religious views and other motivations.45 SNA provides a methodology for the systemic 
analysis of the social ties that develop between violent extremists and those susceptible to 
recruitment.  
2. Social Network Analysis Building-Block Concepts 
Principles associated with SNA are based on commonly accepted concepts of 
SNA identified in several studies. Although applications of SNA differ, they are 
generally described by the social context in which actors and ties are organized in 
network structures.46 Further, social networks function differently depending on their 
configuration, so it is important to identify and understand common SNA measures and 
                                                 
40 Borgatti et al., “Network Analysis in the Social Sciences.” 
41 Charles Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012). 3. 
42 Humera Khan, “Why Countering Extremism Fails: Washington’s Top-Down Approach to 
Prevention Is Flawed,” Foreign Affairs, modified February 18, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs. 
com/articles/united-states/2015-02-18/why-countering-extremism-fails. 
43 Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks; Theories, Concepts, and Findings, 4. 
44 Steve Ressler, “Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present, and 
Future Research, Homeland Security Affairs II, no. 2 (July 2, 2006): 2, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/171. 
45 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism Part II: A Review of Conceptual Models and 
Empirical Research,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 38, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-
0472.4.4.2. 
46 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks: Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences, 8. 
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metrics.47 By examining the interaction between nodes and social ranking, specific 
metrics can be used to enhance an understanding through network analysis. 
a. Actors or Nodes 
The term actors, or nodes, refers to distinct individuals, groups, organizations, 
events, and activities involved in social relations.48 The type of node to node 
transmission is perhaps the most common means for interpreting the effects of social 
networks.49 Thus, within a social network, actors (nodes) are linked together either 
directly or indirectly through a connection shared with another actor resulting in the 
behavior of a network. Conceptually, the purpose of SNA is to identify the positions of 
an actor (or node) in a network, ties (or links) between actors, and the manner in which 
an actor’s behavior is influenced by the larger social network and vice versa.50 See 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  A Network Representation of an Actor (Node).51 
                                                 
47 Ela Oxkan-Canbolat and Aydin Beraha, “Configuration and innovation related network topology,” 
Journal of Innovation & Knowledge 2, no. 1 (2016): 91–98, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jik.2016.01. 
013. 
48 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks: Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences, 8. 
49 Ronald Burt, “The Network Structure of Social Capital,” Organizational Behavior 22 (2000): 350. 
50 Johnson, “Social Network Analysis: A Systematic Approach for Investigating.” 




As described above, actors are connected within a network by ties. Wasserman 
and Faust offered the following examples of ties: 
• ties of sentiment (friendship, liking, respect), 
• resource ties (business transactions, financial flows), 
• ties of association or affiliation (members of the same church or club), 
• behavioral ties (communication ties), 
• ties based on geographic movement (migration, physical mobility), 
• ties based on status movement (social mobility), 
• formal ties (organizational hierarchy), and 
• biological ties (kinship).52 
The type of tie is critical to understanding how social networks are affected. See 
Figure 3. Mark Granovetter’s 1973 groundbreaking study entitled, “The Strength of 
Weak Ties” identified both strong and weak ties.53 He explained the difference between 
strong and weak ties as follows: 
Our acquaintances (“weak ties”) are less likely to be socially involved 
with one another than are our close friends (“strong ties”). Thus the set of 
people made up of any individual and his or her acquaintances will 
constitute a low-density network (one in which many of the possible ties 
are absent), whereas the set consisting of the same individual and his or 
her close friends will be densely knit (many of the possible lines 
present).54 
                                                 
52 Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Application, 8. 
53 Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973): 
1360–1380. 
54 Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited,” Sociological Theory 




Figure 3.  Strong Ties and Weak Ties within a Group. 
Granovetter emphasized the power of weak ties, making the argument that weak 
ties are “indispensable to individuals’ opportunities and to their integration into 
communities; strong ties, breeding local cohesion, lead to overall fragmentation.”55 He 
furthermore stated, “The importance of weak ties is asserted to be that they are 
disproportionately likely to be bridges as compared to strong ties. . . . This does not 
preclude the possibility that most weak ties have no such function.”56 
c. SNA Measures and Metrics 
SNA employs specific relational measures and metrics for the study of the 
structures of networks.57 Thus, SNA helps determine the level of an individual’s or an 
organization’s connectedness within, and the cohesive of, defined networks.58 Cohesion 
                                                 
55 Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” 1360–1380. 
56 Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited,” 201–233. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Alireza Abbasi and Jörn Altmann, “A Social Network System for Analyzing Publication Activities 
of Researchers,” in On Collective Intelligence, ed. Theo J. Bastiaens, Ulrike Baumöl, and Bernd J. Krämer, 
vol. 76 (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010), 49–61, http://link.springer.com/10.1007/ 
978-3-642-14481-3_5. 
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is a property of network connectedness that helps to determine the strength of 
relationships among actors and the resulting formation of clusters, cohesive subgroups, 
connected by strong ties in a network.59 
SNA involves both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Using those 
methodologies, it first determines network membership and the nature of relationships 
that connect members, and then measures structural and behavioral aspects of the 
network. Some common SNA measurements and metrics were referenced in this research 
to construct an SNA framework for analyzing the vulnerability and susceptibility of 
violent extremism in at-risk communities; they are noted below. 
d. Density 
Density is a structural element of social networks. Density is based upon “the 
number of actual direct connections [of individual members] divided by the number of 
possible direct connections in a network”60 and is used to determine the 
interconnectedness of a network.61 Density is a critical measure used in SNA to evaluate 
the sense of trust in a society, conditions of cohesive communities, social support, and 
high visibility, and the social capital network members share.62 Through measuring 
density, the analyst can evaluate the presence or absence of ties in an effort to understand 
the level of diffusion of information, ideas, influence, and other materials and resources 
throughout a network.63 The density of a network typically grows over time and can 
reveal the cohesiveness of a group or community, through either the existence of highly 
connected actors or areas that are disparately linked, as interactions between actors or 
clusters of actors increase.64 
                                                 
59 Peter Carrington, John Scott, and Stanley Wasserman, Models and Methods in Social Network 
Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press). 
60 Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings, 27–32. 
61 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks: Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences, 11. 
62 Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings, 29. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,” The 
American Journal of Sociology 91, no. 3 (1985): 481–510.  
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When comparing density within or to other networks, it is important to take into 
account the overall size of the network. Given the human limitation on the number of ties 
available for connection, the level of density decreases as the number of the actors within 
a network grows.65 Understanding whether relationships are tied directly or indirectly 
and the number of actors between connections can help to establish the level of network 
connectivity between actors.66 
e. Path (and Path Distance) 
Examining the direct and indirect connections between two nodes in a network 
helps to determine the path, or walk (i.e., a sequence of ties or links) between two 
connected vertices or nodes of a network.67 The path measurement is used to trace the 
route an actor has traveled to reach another member of the network.68 In terms of 
diffusion, the links of a path might also expose redundant or inefficient flows of 
information or resources based on whether or not two actors have reciprocal 
relationships.69 Actors that can “reach their counterparts following paths of a particular 
direction”70 characterize strongly structured networks as opposed to weak networks from 
which “actors can be reached through established paths without the consideration of 
direction.”71 Understanding the directional nature of ties is important because it can 
impact the distance between connections. The path distance is defined as the number of 
steps needed to connect one node to another.72 The smallest number of steps between two 
nodes is referred to as the geodesic distance between them.73 A network commonly 
                                                 
65 Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings, 29. 
66 Tetiana Kostiuchenko, “Paths/Walks/Cycles,” in Encyclopedia of Social Networks, ed. George A. 
Barnet (London: SAGE, 2011), 695. 
67 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks: Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences, 11. 
68 Kostiuchenko, “Paths/Walks/Cycles,” 695. 
69 Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings, 32. 
70 Kostiuchenko, “Paths/Walks/Cycles,” 695. 
71 Michael Baker, “Social Networks and High Healthcare Utilization: Building Resilience through 
Analysis” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 31. 
72 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks: Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences, 11. 
73 Ibid. 
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comprises numerous paths of varying lengths, with some shorter or longer than others;74 
however, the path may be geodesic based on whether relationships are reciprocated or not 
(directed or undirected networks). Thus, measuring the longest geodesic distance can 
reveal the overall size of the network, as well as provide a way to effectively analyze the 
network as a whole. 
f. Structural Holes 
The characteristic known as a structural hole represents a lack of connections.75 
Ronald Burt explains, “The holes in social structure or, more simply, structural holes, are 
disconnections or non-equivalencies between players in the arena.”76 Network members 
that only link to one another through a single node or “ego” indicate a structural hole is 
present.77 Depending on the ego’s ability to manipulate/navigate structural holes depends 
in part on her/his base of support.78 If the ego node has only established a limited number 
of connections, it may have limited support to maximize the quantity and quality of 
resources it is able to obtain from the network.79 The presence of structural holes in a 
network constrains a person’s ability to gain access to or exchange information and 
resources thereby limiting their ability to strengthen his or her social capital across the 
network.80 As such, structural holes prevent an individual or group of individuals from 
gaining opportunities to exchange information and inhibit those opportunities from 




                                                 
74 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks: Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences, 11. 
75 Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings, 29. 
76 Ronald Burt, Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), 2. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings, 58. 
79 Stephen P. Borgatti and Virginie Lopez-Kidwell, “Network Theory,” in The SAGE Handbook of 
Social Network Analysis, ed. John Scott and Peter J. Carrington (London: SAGE, 2011), 42. 
80 Burt, Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition, 5. 
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Figure 4.  Example of a Structural Hole. 
g. Centrality or “Popularity” 
Centrality, or “popularity,” is a measure of network topology used to determine 
which nodes are most connected or central to the network.81 Because of their position, 
nodes more central in social networks benefit from easier access to resources and an 
increased efficiency to disseminate information to other nodes.82 Hence, the greater 
centrality, the greater influence anode or actor has among groups, serving as a powerful 
                                                 
81 Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings, 31. 
82 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks: Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences, 12. 
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relay point of information to extend an actor’s influence beyond his or her original 
network. 
Everton provides the examples of commonly used measures of centrality below 
and seen in Figure 5.  
 Degree centrality [denotes] the count of the number of actor’s ties. 
 Closeness centrality measures (based on path distance) how close, on 
average, each actor is to all other actors in a network; some limitations 
[may affect] traditional closeness measure, but alternative measures are 
available. 
 Betweenness centrality measures the extent to which each actor lies on the 
shortest path to all other actors in a network. 
 Eigenvector centrality [denotes the assumption] that ties to highly central 
actors are more important than ties to peripheral actors, so it weights an 
actor’s summed ties to other actors by their centrality scores.83 
 
Figure 5.  Example of Centrality Measures in SNA.84 
                                                 
83 Ibid., 12–13. 




Multiplexity contributes to the identification of actors with high centrality for 
members of the same group with more than one kind of relationship connecting them.85 
Related to the concept of homophily in which people with like characteristics are 
connected and tend to have an effect on one another, multiplexity is exemplified by 
situations where two actors have an organizational relationship based upon employment 
roles (e.g., a supervisor and the supervisor’s assistant) but who are also friends.86 Merton 
described role sets as, “the set of relationships that ensue because one occupies a given 
role,” what he called status.87 For example, a school teacher frequently engages with 
students, parents, school administrators, and the Board of Education. The relationships of 
this role vary based upon the status of a teacher.88 
Content multiplexity is a term that refers to the various flows that can occur 
between two pairs of nodes,89 for example, giving advice, making friends, or exchanging 
tasks for work. Content multiplexity allows for a number of types of ideas to flow 
through a network that present options for resolving a problem.90 By examining 
multiplexity and the actors with high centrality, network analysts can observe the 
consequences of multiple flows of information content and determine how nodes connect 
or interact in a variety of contexts.91 
                                                 
85 Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings, 35. 
86 Jeanne Hurlbert, John J. Beggs, and Valerie Haines, “Social Networks and Social Capital in 
Extreme Environments,” in Social Capital Theory and Research, ed. N. Lin, K. S. Cook, and R. S. Burt 
(New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2000), 209–232. 
87 Robert Merton, “The Matthew Effect in Science,” Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, IL: 
Free Press, 1968), 56–63. 
88 Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings, 36. 
89 Hurlbert, Beggs, and Haines, “Social Networks and Social Capital in Extreme Environments,” 209–
232 
90 Rob Cross, Stephen P. Borgatti, and Andrew Parker, “Beyond Answers: Dimensions of the Advice 
Network,” Social Networks 23, no. 3 (2001): 215–235.  
91 Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings, 36. 
 21 
i. Cohesive Subgroups or Clustering 
The identification of dense clusters of actors is a key function of SNA. 
Wasserman and Faust described a cluster as consisting of actors “among whom there are 
relatively strong, direct, intense, and/or positive ties.”92 Researchers studying social 
networks have often referred to clusters of actors as cohesive subgroups or subnetworks, 
generally congregating around social interaction of actors sharing similar norms, 
identities, and collective behavior.93 Social network analysts examine patterns of ties to 
identify cohesive subgroups within social networks.94 
j. Roles and Positions 
The term role or position is used to identify the types of relationships that connect 
nodes in the wider network.95 Whether tied directly or indirectly, the roles actors play in 
a network explain the related behavior or social processes that result.96 For example, 
father, mother, aunt, or uncle are typical kinship names associated with specific roles in 
the social system and indicate expected relations with other roles. Understanding an 
actor’s role is important in other social network measures, including centrality, clustering, 
and betweenness of a network.97 Social network analysts often study connections among 
particular actors to detect structurally equivalent positions.98 
k. SNA in Government 
In recent years, law enforcement agencies and the U.S. military have increased 
their use of SNA to identify and measure connections among illicit organizations to 
                                                 
92 Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 19. 
93 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks: Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences, 12. 
94 Scott and Carrington, The SAGE Handbook of Social Network Analysis, 3. 
95 Kadushin, Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings, 37. 
96 Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin, “Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency,” 
American Journal of Sociology 99, no. 6 (May 1994): 1411–1454. 
97 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks: Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences, 12. 
98 Ibid., 14. 
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combat crime and terrorism.99 Terrorism experts John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt 
argued that it takes “strong networks to fight networks.”100 SNA has been used to 
illuminate the dark (clandestine or covert) networks among insurgent and criminal 
organizations.101 
By applying a network perspective, law enforcement officials have embraced 
SNA to better understand and counter or preempt gang violence and terrorism. To disrupt 
criminal and gang networks, crime-fighting organizations created topologies showing 
links among” persons of interest.”102 In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) developed law enforcement strategies and interdiction techniques leveraging the 
tools and methodologies of SNA.103 The Common Operational Research Environment 
(CORE) lab at the Naval Postgraduate School recently partnered with law enforcement 
agencies, creating a macro level codebook based on the theoretical underpinnings of 
SNA.104 At the time of this writing, select police agencies in counter violence initiatives 
were in the process of field-testing the codebook. 
Since September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) and intelligence 
communities have attempted to enhance traditional methods of link analysis by using 
SNA to topologically map and measure the networks of insurgent and terrorist 
organizations.105 In 2009, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) organized an 
                                                 
99 Kenneth Stewart, “CORE Lab Helps Law Enforcement Explore Social Network Analysis,” Naval 
Postgraduate School, accessed May 5, 2015, http://www.nps.edu/About/News/CORE-Lab-Helps-Law-
Enforcement-Explore-Social-Network-Analysis.html; Antione C. Fernandes and Travis J. Taylor, “DIM 
Networks: The Utility of Social Network Analysis for Illuminating Partner Security Force Networks” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015); Jason Brown, “Improving Nonlethal Targeting: A 
Social Network Analysis Method for Military Planners” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2012). 
100 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Advent of Netwars (Washington, DC: RAND, 1996), 119.  
101 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ed. Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy (Washington, DC: RAND, 2001). 
102 Ressler, “Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present, and Future 
Research,” 7. 
103 Jennifer Johnson, “Social Network Analysis: A Systematic Approach for Investigating,” Federal 
Bureau of Investigations (FBI), March 3, 2013, https://leb.fbi.gov/2013/march/social-network-analysis-a-
systematic-approach-for-investigating. 
104 “CORE Lab Helps Law Enforcement Explore Social Network Analysis.”  
105 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks: Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences, 18. 
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exchange among academics and government personnel to examine the implications of 
using SNA for information security policymaking.106 Furthermore, many military case 
studies on SNA have been conducted to determine the appropriate structure and influence 
to apply in overseas operations involving friendly or malicious networks.107 In most 
instances, SNA has proven to be a useful methodology for enhancing traditional methods 
of analysis. 
In the realm of national and regional security, terrorism experts have long viewed 
terrorist groups as networks. For homeland security practitioners, this perspective has 
powerful implications for fueling research on the disruption of functioning networks; 
furthermore, SNA may reveal the relationships among actors necessary to increase 
resilience among vulnerable communities at risk from violent extremism. Because much 
work in this area still needs to be done, I have sought to fill a gap by illustrating how an 
understanding of social networks can assist in assessing the risk of violent extremism and 
by suggesting policies and programming aimed at preventing or diminishing the effects 
of radicalization.  
B. RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
A fundamental question in the study of the radicalization process seems to be: 
“How do people come to adopt violent extremist ideologies (radicalize), convert them—
or not—into justifications or imperatives to use terrorist violence, and choose—or not—
to engage in violent and dissident activity in support of those ideologies?”108 
Successfully answering this question requires a general understanding of the phenomenon 
of violent extremism and the various purveyors and targets of radicalization. 
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1. Defining Violent Extremism 
The White House has defined violent extremists as “individuals who support or 
commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals.”109 The 
Administration’s definition of violent extremism, however, requires a deeper 
understanding of what motivates people to commit terrorist violence;110 moreover, when 
confronting ideologies of radical extremism, it is important to distinguish between violent 
versus nonviolent outcomes.111 Observing a person’s nonviolent nature may be useful 
when assessing whether that individual is at risk of eventually resorting to violence 
regardless of whether or not she or he has yet engaged in violent extremist behavior.112 
Because violent extremism is a global security concern, government agencies 
need clear and precise terminology to share information with one another internally, as 
well as to share information externally with other governments. A common frame of 
reference would enable countries to support one another’s strategies and coordinate their 
plans to better address the threat posed by violent extremism.113 Since developing the 
first “Strategy for Empowering Local Communities to Prevent Violent Extremism,” the 
homeland security and intelligence communities have struggled to establish a lexicon for 
the various factors involved in violent extremism. In working with the Brookings 
Institution, the author of a 2016 LawFare article attempted to address this problem by 
proposing a common lexicon related to violent extremism. The following terms were 
offered in the article. 
• Violent extremist organization: An organization that takes action to 
further a violent extremist ideology 
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• Violent extremist: An individual who take action to further a violent 
extremist ideology 
• Resident violent extremist: A violent extremist who takes actions to 
further a violent extremist ideology in the same state in which he or she is 
considered a national under the operation of its law  
• Nonresident violent extremist: A violent extremist who takes actions to 
further a violent extremist ideology in a different state than that in which 
he or she is considered a national under the operation of its law  
• Supported violent extremist: A violent extremist who receives support for 
his or her actions from another violent extremist or a violent extremist 
organization 
• Unsupported violent extremist: A violent extremist who does not receive 
support for his or her actions from another violent extremist or a violent 
extremist organization 
• Inspired action: When a violent extremist takes action that is inspired by a 
violent extremist ideology 
• Directed action: When a violent extremist takes action based upon 
direction he or she received from another violent extremist or a violent 
extremist organization 
• Spontaneous action: When an individual with no known previous 
plausible ties to a violent extremist ideology, violent extremists, or a 
violent extremist organization, suddenly takes action, with little planning 
or preparation, to further a violent extremist ideology 
• Opportunistic claim: When an individual with no known previous 
plausible ties to a violent extremist ideology, violent extremists, or a 
violent extremist organization engages in violence, and a violent extremist 
or violent extremist organization claims responsibility without providing 
proof that they inspired or directed the action114 
An established lexicon would allow those handling issues related to violent 
extremism to use agreed upon terminology to ensure they operate within a shared 
contextual understanding. 
                                                 
114 Walter, “Toward a Common Lexicon of Violent Extremism.” 
 26 
2. Defining Radicalization  
To date, there has been no agreement in the literature with regard to a universal 
definition of the radicalization process.115 Terrorism expert, John Horgan defined 
radicalization as “the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced 
commitment to extremist political or religious ideology.”116 Louis Porter and Mark 
Kebbell offered a broader definition, defining radicalization as “the process by which 
individuals (or groups) change their beliefs, adopt an extremist viewpoint, and advocate 
(or practice) violence to achieve their goals.”117 Conversely, researchers have stated that 
many terrorists—even those who openly ascribe to a particular “cause”—are not 
profoundly ideological, and the traditional process to radicalization may not occur.118 
Clearly, the pathway to radicalization varies considerably from person to person and is a 
matter of individual choice.  
No single theory or discipline or “one size fits all” framework can be used to 
explain the process of radicalization that results in violent extremism, generally, or in 
militant Islamism, specifically.119 Until 2011, most conceptual models focused on a 
defining terrorist mindset or personality, based on the assumption that the unpredictable 
behavior leading to acts of terrorism was the result of some mental or personality 
abnormality.120 Increasingly, researchers of terrorism no longer view radicalization as a 
condition isolated in one person but more as a dynamic and gradual process influenced by 
a multitude of factors along the way.121 Debate still occurs as to whether the trajectory of 
radicalization is a linear or nonlinear sequence that involves multiple interactions and 
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diverse motivations.122 Thus, the process in which radicalization occurs continues to be 
poorly understood.  
Research has thus far failed to provide clear determining factors to characterize 
sufficient conditions for engaging in terrorist activity;123 furthermore, ascribing to 
extremist ideologies does not inevitably predict someone will engage in violence. Many 
who share an extremist view do not in fact support violence.124 Understanding the 
definitions of violent extremism and radicalization is important if we are to develop a 
framework for assessing risk factors and attempting to address them through counter 
radicalization strategies. 
C. ASSESSING RISK FACTORS  
1. Individual-Level Factors 
Ideologically motivated violence is a prevalent theme in studies offering an 
assessment of the process of radicalization and violent extremism,125 specifically 
ideologies that build upon individual or group grievances, religious views, social 
deprivation, or other political and cultural beliefs.126 Following an analysis of over 500 
profiles of radicalized Muslims, former CIA Operations Officer Marc Sageman identified 
potential root causes of radicalization and traced the development of individual Islamist 
radicalization through the following four stages: 
• Islamist radicalization is sparked when the individual reacts with moral 
outrage to stories of Muslims suffering around the world. 
• For some, that spark is inflamed by an interpretation that explains such 
suffering in the context of consistent policies in Western countries that are 
viewed as hostile to Muslims around the world. 
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• The ensuing resentment is fueled by negative personal experiences in 
Western countries (e.g., discrimination, inequality, or merely an inability 
to flourish despite good qualifications). 
• The individual joins a terrorist network that becomes like a second family, 
albeit one closed to the outside world, stoking the radical worldview and 
preparing the initiate for action and, in some cases, martyrdom.127 
In each of these stages specific ideological motivations characterize the reasons 
individuals would involve themselves in Islamist-inspired violence. For some, socializing 
a collective view was also associated with the likelihood that a person would radicalize.  
In exploring the processes of terrorist recruitment and radicalization, 
understanding the factors that may cause someone to adopt extremist ideas is important. 
Many studies include terms, such as push and pull to characterize these factors. Based on 
the guide produced by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
to identify drivers of violent extremism, the European Union-funded initiative 
Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE) developed specific push and 
pull factors relating to radicalization and recruitment cases located near the Horn of 
Africa.128 In a study from STRIVE, push factors were “socioeconomic factors that make 
individuals look for alternatives,” and pull factors were “those that attract people to 
violent groups.”129 Table 1 lists factors in the STRIVE case study of violent extremism in 
Nairobi, Kenya. 
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Table 1.   Examples of “Push” and “Pull” Factors in STRIVE’s Study Found to 
Influence Radicalization Cases in Nairobi, Kenya.130 
Push Factors Pull factors 
Unemployment and poverty Access to material resources 
Clan marginalization Access to weaponry and protection 
Social and political 
marginalization 
Sense of belonging 
Poor (or no) governance Order of strong governance 
Human-rights violations and 
violence 
Revenge-seeking 
Endemic corruption and 
impunity of certain groups 
Self-esteem/personal empowerment (being a 
hero for defending one’s country and religion) 
Youth frustration Religious justification (victory or paradise) 
 
Results of the study showed that “recruitment constitutes an individual choice 
often made as part of a desire to challenge the clan system and its elders; [whereas] 
radicalization and a desire to contribute to international jihad are at the heart of such 
recruitment.”131 Identifying the variables that differentiate reasons individuals join a 
terrorist movement provides substantial insight for strategies intended to counter those 
reasons. 
The synthesis of social–psychological separation among values, feelings, and 
behaviors is frequently used in studies of the radicalization process.132 A distinction can 
be drawn between the concepts of cognitive and behavioral radicalization. James Khalil 
characterized cognitive radicalization as “the possession of extremist beliefs and 
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feelings,”133 and behavioral radicalization as “manifesting a determination to commit 
violence in the furtherance of extremist beliefs and feelings.”134 Observing an 
individual’s nonviolent (cognitive) state may help to identify patterns for predicting a 
particular time when a person is prone to committing themselves to violence (behavioral).  
In addition, researchers have explored social–behavioral relevance to enhance the 
understanding of underlying causes of radicalization. Social movements, social 
psychology, and conversion are the most promising of many of the theoretical–analytic 
frameworks that might support further terrorism studies.135 Each theory offers a basis for 
systematic inquiry into methods to assess the conditions surrounding the susceptibility 
and vulnerability to radicalization leading to extremist violence.136 Some terrorism 
researchers, however, believe factors at the community level are more important for 
examining the local context of recruitment to violent groups and radicalization in certain 
areas.  
2. Community-Level Factors 
Many researchers have attributed the motivations behind radicalization to an 
ideology; others have argued that specific conditions create vulnerabilities in areas of 
marginalized communities. In countries characterized by injustice, corruption, and 
marginalization of targeted groups, as well as social, political, and economic exclusion, 
radicals are more likely to succeed in recruitment efforts.137 Factors at the community 
level are, therefore, important when exploring research methodologies, considerations, 
and challenges in the overall frameworks supporting programs designed to assess the risk 
of violent extremism.  
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According to Hamed al Said, “Muslim communities are among the most 
disadvantaged in terms of economic opportunities, levels of education, political 
representation, wage differentiation, and job opportunities.”138 Such communities are 
located in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Lieutenant General (Ret.) Russel L. 
Honoré asserted that the stability of populations are dependent upon security, political, 
and economic freedoms provided in culturally appropriate ways; however, populations 
unable to achieve this stability are more likely to be vulnerable to terrorist recruitment.139 
Researchers have described and measured the particular conditions under which 
the marginalization of communities might occur and “the extent to which a subgroup, 
including Diaspora communities, felt included in, or excluded from, a larger 
community.”140 Indicators that heightened the possibility and/or rates of radicalization 
were noted in communities that experienced the deprivation of resources, as well as 
significant social disruption.141 In addition, psychologists have asserted that people have 
a fundamental need to maintain healthy and constructive exchanges with others.142 Thus, 
a small, cohesive organization like a terrorist group provides fertile ground to satisfy an 
individual’s desire for inclusion and sense of belonging as a result of social alienation 
from their community.  
Researchers at the University of Maryland’s Study for Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism (START) identified the following community-level factors as underlying 
causes of radicalization among marginalized communities.  
• Economic measures: The extent of economic distress felt by a community, 
including variables, such as unemployment rates, median household 
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income, income inequality, and participation in government assistance 
programs 
• Social capital: The extent to which members of a community feel 
connected to or trusting of neighbors and government, with lower levels of 
social capital being indicative of marginalization. Variables included here 
are family structure (divorce rates, single-parent families), the number (or 
density) of social service organizations, civic organizations or arts/sports 
organizations, and voter turnout rates. 
• Political inclusion or exclusion: The extent to which members of a 
community feel included in local politics and political institutions. These 
variables include participation rates in local elections, active involvement 
in political campaigns, and the extent to which members of a subgroup are 
elected or appointed to local offices.  
• Social support: The greater the amount of services available, the less 
vulnerable a community may be to radicalization. Measures of support 
include Head Start programs, number of children enrolled in Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) or Medicaid, and, for Diaspora 
communities, the number of organizations or individuals receiving money 
from state Offices of Refugee Resettlement. 
• Demographics of Diaspora community: The social structure of an 
immigrant community is vital to a community’s success. Factors that may 
impact the prevalence of radicalization include the age at which 
immigrants arrive in the United States, the number of foreign language 
speakers or students of English as a Second Language (ESL) classes, and 
the extent to which the community establishes its own institutions such as 
banks and local media.143 
Institutional data used to examine community-level indicators in the process of 
radicalization may be too broad to provide sufficient guidance on the location, timing, 
and reasons for individual radicalization;144 however, such data may be useful in law 
enforcement outreach efforts to counter or prevent the emergence of violent extremism in 
communities. 
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3. Social Network Factors 
Researchers conducting studies of radicalization have argued that the relational 
ties to family, close friends, or kin in an individual’s social network serve as the most 
likely factor influencing a person’s decision to commit acts of extremist violence.145 
Obtaining a general understanding of the influence social networks may have in a 
person’s path to radicalization is, therefore, important. This section provides a review of 
literature that characterizes the social networks of individuals as drivers of violent 
extremism. 
As noted above, social scientists and terrorism experts have recognized that 
preexisting kinship and friendship ties to extremists in a person’s social network can 
increase that individual’s propensity to radicalize. Clark McCauley and Sophia 
Moskalenko outlined a series of mechanisms, described as the “slippery slope,” that 
promotes individual and group radicalization. One mechanism identified in the 
individual’s radicalization was an increase in identification with “in-group” relationships, 
such as ties with family or a loved one who is radical.146 Researchers examining political 
participation, social activism, gangs, cult membership, right-wing and left-wing 
terrorism, and religious extremism have identified key intermediaries aiding in 
recruitment mostly through preexisting friendship and kinship ties.147 In an individual’s 
search for meaningful relationships and self-validity, radical associations were viewed as 
psychologically and materially beneficial.148 
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When recruiting individuals who reveal the potential to commit violence, radicals 
look to create interpersonal ties, social bonds, and trust, often facilitated through highly 
personal, local contact.149 Terrorism expert Nadav Morag described such a situation in 
the recruitment of young Western Muslims into terrorist cells loyal to the jihadist 
movements. Morag discovered that establishing a type of “brotherhood in Islam” formed 
a sense of camaraderie and made recruiting easier for radicals.150 Moreover, “jihadist 
cells attached to a particular sheikh will attempt to create strong social bonds between 
members while isolating them from the broader society.”151 Terrorists who are more 
central among social groups of a network often gain a greater ability to organize and lead 
terrorist activities and therefore create the ideal conditions to collectively promote and 
socialize their grievances and ideologies.  
In a 2004 study, Sageman collected data on over 400 terrorists, finding that social 
structures were instrumental in the recruitment of young men who later committed acts of 
terrorism.152 He discovered that systematically investing time to understand an 
individual’s interests, morals, and beliefs or social class allowed members of the radical 
group to create a growing sense of collective identity, convincing the young men to 
endorse violence on behalf of jihad.153 In social network analysis, this type of motivation 
to join others with similar backgrounds or interests is referred to as homophily, “people 
who share common attributes with others are more likely to engage in connection, 
friendship, or association.”154 Identifying the relationships that tie violent extremists 
together in social networks can assist in assessing risk factors and relationship patterns 
associated with the radicalization of individuals.  
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Social groups created through preexisting networks play a critical role in the 
radicalization process.155 Radicals rely on preexisting networks, such as community 
centers, sports teams, educational and faith-based organizations, social movements, and 
prisons when searching for prospective candidates regarded as susceptible to the militant 
jihadist cause.156 The clustering of actors in these networks creates cohesive groups that 
can benefit terrorist organizations. Clustering also increases the density of the existing 
network of violent extremists; therefore, using measures of density, clustering and 
relational ties can be instrumental in developing plans to counter or prevent the flow of 
communications, access to resources, and sources of social support necessary to the 
success of violent extremist networks. 
Terrorist groups have proven adept in establishing an overwhelming presence 
online. Many of them rely on social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, to 
influence individuals sympathetic to their cause. By virtually leveraging “friend of a 
friend” relationships, existing members or sympathizers are able to bridge the gap 
between potential recruits and radical leaders or influencers.157 On one hand, bridging the 
structural holes of a network is beneficial for spreading extremist beliefs that can enhance 
recruitment and radicalization efforts. On the other hand, the use of social media can 
increase the ability of intelligence analysts to uncover and map terrorist social networks, 
using social media as a tool to identify certain roles and positions most central in 
organizations of violent extremists. By studying connections among actors, Homeland 
Security professionals can identify the key players in violent extremist organizations. 
Understanding the underlying relationships connecting terrorists to one another 
has become prevalent in SNA research. In Disrupting Dark Networks, Sean Everton 
explained his application of SNA to examine a terrorist organization by using specific 
metrics to determine the most influential nodes and relationships in the network.158 
                                                 
155 Davis and Cragin, Social Science for Counterterrorism, 36. 
156 Hafez and Mullins, The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to 
Homegrown Extremism, 964. 
157 Todd Waskiewicz, Friend of a Friend Influence in Terrorist Social Networks (New York: Air 
Force Research Laboratory, AFRL/RIEA, 2012), 1. 
158 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks: Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences, 5. 
 36 
Everton stated that recruiting people with a shared sense of identities and norms is easier 
than seeking to convert outsiders through unfamiliar connections.159 In applying SNA to 
the phenomenon of radicalization, understanding that the context of radicalization varies 
based on human nature is a necessity.160 Knowing an individual’s social network, to 
include the specific events and cultures that come into play, helps to correlate factors of 
human behavior with reasons individuals radicalize.161 
Daniel Aldrich found that the ties amid family, peers, and kin were the most 
difficult to counter when attempting to deradicalize or disengage people who participated 
in terrorist activities.162 Individuals often felt trapped by peer pressure, groupthink, and 
ideological commitment and were subsequently less able to exit their social network.163 
Such hesitation was attributed to the constant in-group and out-group dynamics of radical 
networks. To this point, focus must be placed on the relational ties most influential in a 
person’s life if one is to be successful in countering the ideologies that led a person to 
radicalize in the first place. By targeting those same ties, homeland security practitioners 
can identify the actors or nodes of a person’s social network most likely to be effective in 
reversing that person’s decision to support or engage in violence. 
Many social scientists have claimed their research can help focus and prioritize 
interventions among potential violent extremists with the goal of preventing or 
transferring the initial stages of radicalization, disrupting ongoing terrorist activity, or 
encouraging disengagement and supporting deradicalization.164 Although progress has 
been made in these areas, much work remains, particularly in disengagement and risk 
assessment frameworks. For that reason, future researchers should seek to close the gap 
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between theoretical constructs and the implementation of prevention and to counter 
violent radicalization with policies and programming across government. In this research 
a framework has been proposed in which SNA is used systematically and methodically to 
identify vulnerabilities of individuals and communities at risk of violent extremism.  
D. COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
In recent years, CVE has become a top global security concern. In numerous 
government strategies, CVE generally includes approaches constructed from a wide 
range of policies and programs aimed to dissuade individuals from radicalizing to 
violence.165 Thus, prevention is characterized broadly in approaches of CVE.  
The White House has outlined key components for countering radicalization in 
the national CVE strategy entitled Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States by “engaging and empowering individuals and groups at 
the local level to build resilience against violent extremism.”166 A companion document 
entitled The Strategic Implementation Plan builds upon the 2010 National Security 
Strategy and the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, and the 2011 Plan, 
specifically describing activities by departments and agencies and the focus of the 
government on three core areas for”(1) enhancing engagement with and support to local 
communities; (2) building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing 
violent extremism; and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our 
ideals.”167 
In accordance with the Strategic Implementation Plan, as directed under the 
Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8): National Preparedness, the National 
Prevention Framework establishes federal agencies roles and responsibilities “necessary 
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to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism.”168 Under PPD-8, The 
Framework prescribes a threat and risk assessment known as the Threat and Hazard 
Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) to determine a community’s vulnerability to 
terrorism and violent extremism by assessing their capabilities to prevent “to avoid, 
prevent or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism.”169 The four steps prescribed in the 
THIRA process are typically conducted by officials in states and urban areas in a linear 
fashion to (1) identify the types of threats and hazards of concern; (2) to provide factors 
to consider, describing the context under which the threats and hazards were identified; 
(3) to establish the impacts and desired outcome, referred to as capability targets, to 
address the threats and hazards of concern; and, (4) to apply the assessment results, which 
estimate the gaps in capabilities, thus identifying specific resources that will close those 
gaps. The assessment of prevention capabilities includes planning; public information 
and warning, and operational coordination; intelligence and information sharing; 
interdiction and disruption; screening, search, and detection; and forensics and 
attribution.170 
Although designated “prevention,” the definition in the framework serves 
primarily to stop or deter a known or imminent threat. Addressing an imminent or known 
threat, however, fails to assess an individual’s and community’s vulnerability for violent 
extremism at the beginning of the radicalization process, inhibiting the ability of 
communities to anticipate and mitigate the underlying causes of radicalization, resulting 
from persistent and ongoing vulnerabilities. This type of approach does little to prevent or 
counter radicalization if an individual is considering or has already committed to the 
militancy supported by a violent extremist organization. 
In the past, designers of counterterrorism programs have favored the use of “hard 
power,” such as military force, drone strikes, and covert operations, as effective strategies 
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for handling extremist groups because the results are clear and immediate.171 Unlike 
counterterrorism programs focused on disrupting or mitigating damage from active 
terrorist operations, the purpose of CVE is primarily to prevent violence before it occurs. 
Humera Khan defined CVE as the “use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or 
groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation 
or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of 
political objectives.”172 Quite frequently the term soft power is referenced in approaches 
to CVE and is becoming heavily used by the US to shape and influence efforts at home 
and abroad.173 
The literature on CVE includes descriptions of various strategies. Focused on the 
“root causes” of violent extremism, prevention work or engagement processes have been 
increasingly used in methods of CVE.174 Moreover, support centered on social–
psychological or behavioral factors, often led by law enforcement or civil society 
organizations,175 have mainly focused on factors known to increase the vulnerability of 
individuals who may be at risk for violence, assisting in targeted interventions that can 
interdict radicalization or violent extremism.176 
From a socioeconomic perspective, violent extremism has been regularly viewed 
as a labor–supply problem, generating CVE efforts to reduce the allure of radicalization 
by building institutions of partner governments, integrating oppressed individuals and 
groups into society, and providing social services.177 In marginalized communities, the 
rise of radicalization is less likely to occur in those with higher levels of cohesion and 
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inclusiveness.178 Most rehabilitation programs have been designed specifically to 
disengage or deradicalize those motivated by disenfranchisement in these communities.  
An evaluation of existing CVE programs provided three broad program types: 
• Prevention programs designed to prevent the radicalization process from 
taking hold in the first place and generally [intended to] target a segment 
of society rather than a specific individual; 
• Disengagement programs designed to convince an individual to abandon 
involvement in a terrorist group; and  
• Deradicalization programs designed to alter extremist beliefs that an 
individual holds.179 
Generally, programs for prevention have typically targeted entire groups, but 
programs for disengagement and deradicalization have focused on strategies tailored 
toward individuals. Prior to 2006, concepts of disengagement and deradicalization were 
less likely to appear in discussions surrounding counterterrorism strategies. In 2005, a 
conference hosted by the RAND Corporation was one of the first efforts to address 
deradicalization specifically in relation to modern-day Islamist radicalization and 
recruitment.180 In many studies, disengagement and deradicalization were noted as 
markedly different, in that someone can disengage from terrorism but not necessarily 
deradicalize from their beliefs.181 
As noted above, relevant push and pull factors have been incorporated as 
variables influencing the causes of radicalization. The same factors have also been used 
in deradicalization and disengagement work to address the ideologies that have led 
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individuals to adopt extremist violence. Table 2 provides various examples of the factors 
identified throughout the review.  
Table 2.   Examples of Push and Pull Factors Used in Deradicalization and 
Disengagement Programs.182 
Class of Factor Examples 
Push Factors 
• Criminal prosecution 
• Parental or social disapproval 
• Counter violence from oppositional 
groups 
• Loss of faith in ideology or politics of 
group 
• Discomfort with group’s violent 
activities 
• Disillusionment with group’s 
leadership 
• Loss of confidence, status or position 
in group 
• Ejection from the group 
• Exhaustion from tension and 
uncertainty as a member of a targeted 
group 
• Increased activity in a “competing 
role,” for example, political activity 
that displaces the violent role 
 
Pull Factors 
• Desire for a normal life 
• Desire to establish a family and take 
on parental and spousal roles 
• Other changing priorities 
• New employment or educational 
opportunities that could be 
undermined if group membership were 
known 
• New role model or social group 
• New, more compelling ideology or 
belief structure 
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The factor examples above suggest the manner in which an individual may be 
drawn away from the potential to commit violence.183 These are often used in strategies 
targeting individuals who are on the fence with supporting violence or are prospective 
candidates for deradicalization or disengagement efforts. For example, in many CVE 
studies the critical role of a gatekeeper has been identified as, those “best positioned to 
notice, and refer, individuals deemed at-risk of engaging in a given undesirable behavior 
(in this case, an act of violent extremism) to resources that might help divert those 
individuals from engaging in such behavior.”184 These studies also noted the importance 
of determining the constraints that prevent those gatekeepers from cooperating with 
CVE-related networks.185 Representatives of USAID and the Department of State in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan recently acknowledged a “need to increase local, extended 
studies of the change in attitudes and behaviors from the beginning of an intervention to 
the end.”186 
Although those in the CVE field have experienced a significant increase in 
requests by policymakers for engagement and research, this work is still in incipient 
stages of development.187 Only in the past few years have government-supported CVE 
programs come into prominence. In 2009, the United Kingdom developed and 
implemented the CONTEST strategy to counter Islamist radicalization,188 only to 
conduct its first evaluation in 2011, repurposing its PREVENT section to focus on 
building trust between local law enforcement and their respective communities.189 The 
immaturity of the field has resulted in a paucity of measurement and evaluation data for 
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examining the impact and outcomes of specific programs. In the United States, the 
Strategic Implementation Plan represents only the beginning of efforts to assess the 
advancement and effectiveness of America’s CVE programs, such as pilot programs in 
the cities of Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and Boston.190 
When assessing the risk of violent extremism, policymakers must look outside the 
existing scope of assessment and analysis if they are to counter or prevent the threat of 
violent extremism prior to the onset of an impending threat. Specifically, CVE policies 
and programs lack an appropriate framework to systematically examine radicalization 
factors in the context of the social structure of a community. This thesis incorporates a 
conceptual theory of the manner in which SNA can close the gap in CVE prevention 
programming, providing a more strategic and social understanding of the motivations 
behind the nation’s adversaries. Thus, a method is offered to map and measure social 
networks, assessing the vulnerabilities of at-risk communities and integrating it into the 
federally established THIRA process.  
E. A SOCIAL NETWORK APPROACH TO PREVENTION 
As noted above, many terrorism researchers have agreed that social networks play 
an integral role in both the recruitment and radicalization of individuals into networks of 
violent extremism. These networks, in turn, influence the behavior of people who become 
radicalized. An optimal approach to understanding terrorism and violent extremism 
would benefit from a focus on the dynamics of social networks.191 
This literature review suggests that the use of SNA may increase the ability of law 
enforcement agencies to deter and reduce crime and could contribute to other agencies’ 
efforts to combat and disrupt terrorist activities.192 John Horgan’s research, which 
introduced the “routes over roots” paradigm of network analysis, explained that causal 
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roots are less important than mapping the radicalization pathways of terrorists.193 SNA 
offers a methodology to interpret social and natural phenomena related to the exchanges 
among violent extremists and has increasingly been proven to be a valuable tool in 
countering terrorism. 
In the reduction and prevention of radicalization and resulting violent extremism, 
SNA offers a mechanism to locate key players and events, providing useful information 
in the development of counterterrorism strategies.194 For instance, strategists might seek 
to use SNA to identify key actors to be removed or discredited and to countervail 
influences, thereby disrupting the flow of information and destabilizing the network, to 
isolate a person from their existing extremist network.195 Morselli stated that egocentric 
network data drawn from such sources provides a:  
chronology of a participant’s evolution from his initial entry into a given 
illegal activity, gradual rise and establishment of a reputation, and 
eventual fall, . . .taking place via a contact to contact narrative pattern. . . . 
The aim should be toward identifying various transitions, events, or 
outcomes.196 
Thus, the tools and methodology of SNA provide for analysis of personal (ego) 
networks to uncover actors (or clusters of actors) who are highly central in influencing an 
individual’s behavior.197 A consensus among emerging research is that an understanding 
of social networks can play a key role in policies and programs to address violent 
extremism.198 
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U.S. programs in other countries have capitalized on the use of social networks to 
assist in reducing or diminishing the vulnerabilities of potentially marginalized 
communities at risk of violent extremism. Social networks among members of a 
community were used to rapidly disseminate ideas or innovation for activities, such as 
resolving conflicts using mediation rather than violence.199 Moreover, CVE programs led 
by USAID in Africa introduced a large percentage of Timbuktu residents “to new norms 
directly through participation in U.S. government programs and indirectly through their 
social networks.”200 Ultimately, the connections with friends, acquaintances, and family 
facilitated the engagement in CVE activities or promoted it, influencing new behaviors 
and attitudes through social influence and learning between individuals in a certain 
network.  
Increasingly, researchers have come to understand that the nurturing of strong, 
positive social networks was largely responsible for the building of healthy, dynamic, and 
inclusive societies.201 A number of state deradicalization efforts to reeducate and 
reintegrate individuals into society have focused on their identity, values, and beliefs, as 
well as their extracurricular activities, leveraged primarily through their social and 
familial ties.202 “Maintaining good physical and mental health and being an active 
participant in civic life resulted in the greater social connectedness of individuals to 
friendship groups, career paths, community organizations and social and cultural 
resources.”203 
By employing SNA, policymakers may better identify and predict segments of the 
population most susceptible to radicalization and use the findings to identify how best to 
engage in a CVE-related provider network. Unfortunately, this literature review yielded 
little evidence that SNA has been used in the CVE field to assess the susceptibility to 
violent extremism within communities here in the United States or abroad. The aim of 
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this thesis was to close the gap in available studies to improve current policies and 
programming for preventing and countering violent extremism. 
F. CONCLUSION 
With the evolution of socially connected networks of influence across the globe, 
recognizing a paradigm shift of terrorism in the 21st century is essential. The crucial stage 
in the radicalization process occurs when a person begins to believe that, whatever his or 
her ideology or grievance may be, vigilante justice and violence are justified.204 To 
prevent such a situation, the social networks facilitating the spread of radical ideologies 
must be understood, and their influence discredited and disrupted. In this thesis, I have 
synthesized the literature and research from several distinct fields and used case studies 
to search for signals that might be useful to homeland security professionals in CVE-
relevant fields. I have introduced the application of SNA for assessing the risk of violent 
extremism as a means of developing and incorporating measures that will anticipate and 
mitigate the threat of radicalization and violent extremism before it begins.  
Constructing a theoretical framework by incorporating these findings into the 
THIRA process will lead policymakers to develop strategies premised on the connections 
among relationships at the individual and community levels to scope programs, policies, 
and processes of prevention that build the capacity and resilience of a community. 
Incorporating this type of methodology may offer greater insight into the growing threat 
from violent extremism in U.S. communities.  
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III. METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this research, I sought to determine whether SNA can reduce the vulnerability 
of a community if used within the THIRA process and what the implications would be 
for reducing the risk of radicalization into violent extremism. The second research 
question was designed to examine how to incorporate SNA in the THIRA process to 
anticipate and mitigate radicalization and in what ways current homeland security 
organizations acknowledge or use SNA in their prevention assessment tools and methods. 
A qualitative, explorative approach was used to analyze the social networks of 
both radicalized violent extremists and communities desiring to prevent or preempt 
individuals from radicalization. Primary and secondary sources, including a variety of 
articles, reports, books, and research studies, were used to collect data and information 
regarding the phenomenon of radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism to 
determine whether social networks were previously measured and to what extent. The 
textual data was transcribed and categorized into the social network relational categories 
identified in the literature review. From that point, a theoretical framework was proposed, 
that would use the measures and metrics of SNA to help illuminate how and why 
individuals radicalize, deradicalize, and disengage from malign social networks to assess 
the risk of, and to help counter radicalization and violent extremism. Thus, the primary 
goal of this research was to reveal whether SNA can significantly contribute to predicting 
when individuals in a given social network are more at risk than others to becoming 
radicalized.  
A. MULTIPLE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
The study design for this thesis pursues a multiple case study approach to 
qualitatively analyze the data available on radicalization from the literature review. 
According to Robert Yin, “The case study method is best applied when research 
addresses descriptive or explanatory questions and aims to produce a first-hand 
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understanding of people and events.”205 Larry Dooley stated that case study methodology 
“emphasizes detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and 
their relationships,”206 which can contribute to all levels of theory development. The 
primary benefit of this type of analysis is that it provides the researcher an ability to 
examine a phenomenon or event in context using multiple sources. In the case of 
terrorism research, case studies have been used to determine the general logic behind 
hostile decisions in the planning process and formulate common solutions that can be 
used to exploit that process.207 
I have used case studies to elucidate the role of the policymaker in anticipating 
and mitigating the threat of violent extremism. These case studies examined how 
radicalization and violent extremism in marginalized communities compares with 
radicalization in places other than marginalized communities; how in-depth studies of 
non-marginalized community-based prevention programs compare with social-networked 
based community services; and how social networks in marginalized communities 
contribute to, or counter, radicalization. Three case studies were selected based on the 
following criteria: 1) each dealt with confirmed cases of radicalization, 2) each occurred 
in the last ten years, and 3) each was conducted in an area where ongoing government 
programs were in place to counter violent extremism. The objective of my analysis was 
to examine the potential applications of SNA in the context of each case study to 
determine whether SNA would be worth considering for inclusion in the THIRA process. 
The first case study, that of Omar Hammami, the English-speaking, Western face 
of the Somali insurgent–jihadist movement al-Shabab was used to demonstrate the 
theoretical application of SNA concepts to identify and locate key actors and target them 
for the exploitation, or diminution of violent extremist networks. The second case, which 
took place in Victoria, Australia, where emerging efforts to promote a tolerant, safe, and 
                                                 
205 Robert K. Yin, Applications of Case Study Research, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2011), 
3.  
206 Larry M. Dooley, “Advances in Developing Human Resources, Case Study Research and Theory 
Building,” SAGE Journal 4, no. 3 (August 1, 2002): 336. 
207 “Terrorism Case Studies,” July 5, 2013, https://protectioncircle.org/2013/07/05/terrorism-case-
studies/. 
 49 
inclusive society—in the face of growing multiculturalism in Australia—was used to 
evaluate grass-roots community programs for counter radicalization. The final case study 
involved the CVE program directed towards Islamic education and deradicalization 
efforts in Glasgow Scotland, providing insight into whether or not SNA could have 
significantly contributed to the outcomes. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Each section in this thesis builds upon the literature and findings before it to 
create a comprehensive picture. Previous research is used to develop a concept regarding 
the application of SNA for assessing risk factors of radicalization and violent extremism, 
and a theoretical framework is developed from literature. By using the multi-case study 
analysis, this framework is refined to include factors affecting the vulnerability of 
communities within the field of terrorism and violent extremism prevention. The findings 
of this analysis are incorporated into the four-step process of FEMA’s THIRA framework 
demonstrating the use of SNA concepts for anticipating and mitigating the threat of 
radicalization and violent extremism in at risk communities.  
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IV. MULTIPLE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
The case studies presented in this section include the successful radicalization of 
American Omar Shafik Hammami; Victoria, Australia’s grass-roots community programs 
to promote anti-extremism; and Glasgow, Scotland’s prevention program for countering 
violent extremism through exposure to recognized Islamic scholarship. First, each case 
study is presented by describing the history and background of the area or situation. Next, 
an analysis is provided that explores the theoretical concepts and principles in SNA, the 
relevant factors from the radicalization and counter radicalization processes, and suggests 
how employing SNA’s methodology could have contributed to outcomes. The case study 
findings provide a summation of the analysis, ultimately illustrating the value of 
integrating SNA into a process focused on assessing a community’s risk of violent 
extremism. 
A. CASE STUDY 1: OMAR SHAFIK HAMMAMI 
I think I was the most popular guy in school. I used to be a social butterfly. 
I would hop from circle to circle and associate with all of the different 
types of people. . . . I didn’t just do what everyone else was doing. 
—Omar Hammami 
1. Synopsis of Hammami Case Study 
From 2007 through 2013, Omar Shafik Hammami was known as the most 
prominent foreign fighter to join Al-Shabab, the Somali insurgent–jihadist movement.208 
In Hammami’s eyes, he had finally embarked upon his journey to personal jihad. Of 
those who knew Hamammi, most referred to him as Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki, which 
translates to “the American,” acknowledging his Western, English-speaking roots.209 A 
first of its kind, Hammami’s autobiography, The Story of an American Jihaadi: Part One, 
depicts his time prior to joining Al-Shabab, followed by the days leading up to his 
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decision to join the jihad. The work has provided an insider’s perspective on the reasons 
individuals like him resort to violent extremism. Researchers who have studied 
Hammami’s radicalization have argued that his social networks were highly influential in 
his trajectory from radicalization to violent extremism.210 Because my research was 
intended to determine whether using SNA can reduce the vulnerability of radicalization 
and violent extremism, the following case study applies concepts from the literature on 
SNA to identify and locate the actors (or nodes) and the specific turning points crucial to 
Hammami’s transformation into a jihadist. I have incorporated the findings from this 
analysis into FEMA’s process of THIRA, proposing a new method for assessing a 
community’s susceptibility to radicalization and risk of violent extremism to prevent or 
diminish the effects of radicalization. 
2. Background: Omar Hammami’s Radicalization Process 
Born in 1987, Omar Shafik Hammami spent most of his childhood and adult years 
in the small town of Daphne, Alabama. Like his mother, Hammami was an Alabaman 
despite the name given to him by his father, a Syrian immigrant.211 Growing up a 
Southern American Protestant, Hammami’s mother Debra held deeply Christian beliefs. 
Hammami’s father, Shafik, was not very religious, dedicating most of his time to 
business but remaining true to his Arab cultural traditions and Muslim faith. Thus, 
Hammami’s blend of ethnic and religious experiences was unique in the Daphne 
community.  
Both of Hammami’s parents were adamant he learn each of their ancestors’ 
cultural and religious traditions. He was raised a Baptist and attended church with his 
mother, but he was asked by her to keep his Baptist affiliation a secret from his father. At 
an early age, Hammami was introduced to Islam, learning how to pray in the Muslim 
tradition and read from the Qur’an while on a trip with his father to visit relatives in 
Damascus, Syria. This appears to be the beginning of a deep internal conflict for 
Hammami about his views of Christianity. At age 12, he wrote in his diary, “Sometimes I 
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get confused because the Bible says one thing and our textbooks and Darwin say 
another.”212 This appears to be a critical time in Hammami’s life, when he felt compelled 
to decide whether he should remain Christian or Muslim. 
By the time Hammami reached high school, he was one of the most popular 
students at Daphne High School. Hammami possessed a charismatic personality, 
providing him the ability to make friends easily. His high school sweetheart was Lauren 
Stevenson, who was recognized as one of the most beautiful girls in school. She later 
recalled, “He could just command people with his energy.”213 Unbeknownst to many of 
his classmates, however, Hammami was experiencing internal conflicts. Following the 
trip to Syria, he later recalled the comfort he derived from his Muslim faith and Islam.214 
Hammami was especially fond of his male cousins, characterizing their relationship as a 
“cohesiveness of brotherhood.”215 His high school years appeared to have been a critical 
turning point when he admitted, “Slowly I started to incline toward Islam.”216 
Hammami’s father eventually learned that his son also practiced Christianity with 
his mother and thus decided to introduce him to a shaykh living in Daphne to advance his 
understanding of Islam and the Muslim faith.217 The shaykh instructed him to change his 
habits, including his wardrobe and his prayers, as well as his thoughts regarding the 
persecution of Muslims around the world.218 Hammami subsequently formed a Muslim 
Club with other students sharing similar views and to practice their Muslim faith. During 
this time, he met Bernie Culveyhouse, who would later become his best friend and 
convert to Islam.219 
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During his high school years, Hammami’s commitment to the Muslim faith 
intensified. His impatience with his classmates who were not Muslim increased, and their 
relationships deteriorated. This included his relationship with his girlfriend Stevenson, 
who recalled that Hammami’s deeply held Muslim beliefs were too much for her. 
Ultimately, her refusal to convert to Islam led him to terminate their relationship. 
Hammami also experienced conflicts with his classmates, and Kathleen Hirsch, a teacher 
he most respected. At one point, he chastised Hirsch regarding her Jewish faith, and as a 
result, was temporarily suspended during his junior year.220 Nonetheless, Hammami was 
intellectually gifted, achieving high grades and test scores, which resulted in bypassing 
his senior year of high school and immediately enrolling at the University of South 
Alabama, where he frequented a mosque on campus. This led to friendships with other 
like-minded students, and shortly thereafter, he became president of the Muslim Student 
Association.221 
Following the attacks on 9/11, local reporters in Daphne called Hammami to 
request interviews because of his role in the Muslim Student Association. Unable to 
answer many of the questions asked of him regarding the specifics of Islamic faith, he felt 
insufficiently knowledgeable about Islam.222 He decided he needed a deeper 
understanding of his faith and set out to expand his understanding, reaching out to Tony 
Salavatore Sylvester, a 35-year-old Islamic teacher at the local university, who was 
recognized as an expert in the American Salafi movement.223 Hammami later described 
Sylvester as a key influence in helping him master Salafism and a more profound sense 
of discipline regarding Islam.224 
Hammami dropped out of college in 2002 to further his objective of becoming a 
true scholar of Islam. Over the next several years, he traveled around the country, 
sharpening his Arabic speaking skills and sharing his Islamic faith with others. He 
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attended several Islamic conferences and eventually landed in Mobile, Alabama,225 
where he opened a Muslim bookstore with his friend and mentor Sylvester.226 This was a 
challenging time for Muslims in the United States with a great deal of suspicion, distrust, 
and intolerance toward the Muslim population. Hammami and his friends were no longer 
accepted in the community, and the feeling of oppression was overwhelming and 
intolerable for them.227 Hammami and Sylvester decided to leave Alabama and seek a 
more profound understanding of Islam and jihad. They relocated to Toronto, Canada, 
well aware that a significant and active community of Muslims lived there.228 
Hammami felt immediately at home in Toronto. The intermingling of mosques, 
Islamic bookstores, and community practice of Islam enthralled him.229 Shortly after 
arriving in Toronto, he rented an apartment with his friend Culveyhouse and found work 
through local Somali ties delivering milk to housewives.230 Hammami soon met and 
married his first wife Sadiyo Mohamed Abdille.231 After living in Toronto for some time, 
he hardened his perspective about his country of birth and developed a profound disdain 
for the United States. Acquaintances he met around Toronto shared their anger about the 
U.S.-led invasion in Iraq. At this time, Hammami befriended an Egyptian citizen at work, 
who exposed him to the perceived persecution of Muslims in Somalia by Christians in the 
West.232 As the United States continued operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, his 
resentment toward Western ideology increased. A turning point in his radicalization, 
Hammami pursued conspiracy theories for months that centered on the oppression of 
Muslims by the West, reconsidering his nonmilitant stance.233 Following his short stay in 
Toronto, he decided to explore a life committed to the jihadist movement. As a result, 
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Hammami, his wife, Culveyhouse, and an Egyptian friend all moved to Alexandria, 
Egypt.234 
Hammami and his group arrived in Alexandria and were disappointed by what 
they found. They realized Muslims who lived in Alexandria were not concerned with the 
religious or spiritual matters of Islam. In addition, Culveyhouse’s plans to attend Al-
Azhar University, a recognized Sunni Islam university fell through, and he realized his 
journey to jihad was not consistent with Hammami’s. He later recalled, “I didn’t want to 
continue down this fool’s [Hammami’s] path.”235 When Culveyhouse and his family 
departed from Egypt, Hammami felt betrayed; he and Culveyhouse soon drifted apart.  
In April 2006, Hammami accessed online sources to seek a deeper understanding 
of Islamic ideology. That research led him to Daniel Maldonado.236 Maldonado, 27, also 
an American-born Muslim convert, was a Salafist and teacher of the Qur’an, who had 
resided in Egypt since he and his family left New Hampshire the previous year. Soon 
after their exchanges online, Hammami and Maldonado met in person. Their friendship 
grew stronger over time as Maldonado educated Hammami in proper Islamic practices 
and how to live as a Salafist Muslim.237 They often travelled together while visiting 
underserved Egyptian communities and secretive mosques.238 Hammami was unaware 
that Maldonado was an active jihadist who had fought in Somalia some years earlier. 
Upon hearing of Maldonado’s militant experience, he realized this was an opportunity to 
learn about the jihadists and to possibly participate in the movement. In 2006, he and his 
newfound jihadist brother traveled to Mogadishu, Somalia, to join the guerilla army 
known as Al-Shabab.239 Hammami later wrote in an email, “I made it my goal to find 
those guys should I make it to Somalia,” adding that he “signed up for training.”240 
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Upon arrival in Mogadishu, Hammami and his friend immediately connected with 
a network consisting entirely of jihadist brothers and leaders.241 Maldonado’s prior 
engagement with Al-Shabab easily afforded Hammami acceptance into the network. He 
found himself surrounded by fellow jihadists, and his network of contacts increased 
substantially.242 With Al-Shabab’s acceptance, Hammami’s ties with jihadists continued 
to strengthen. He was allowed to travel with them and was introduced to many of the 
most influential leaders of Al-Shabab. Their influence over Hammami inspired a renewed 
commitment to participate actively in the jihadist movement.243 During Hammami’s 
indoctrination into Al-Shabab, his new friend Maldonado fell ill and was forced to depart 
from the jihadist network. Hamammi’s autobiography mentions nothing of Maldanado 
after his trip to Chiamboni, Somalia.244 
Hammami quickly ascended the ranks of Al-Shabab, serving as a commander, a 
recruiter, and a propagandist for the organization.245 As one of the most prominent 
members of the jihadist organization, he continued to expand his ties to other Muslim 
jihadists to include influential Islamic fundamentalist leaders in Al-Shabab, as well as 
members of Al-Qaeda.246 Because of infighting among the leaders of Al-Shabab, the 
group eventually split into two factions: the Asmara group and the Xarakah ash-shabaab 
al-Mujaahidiin. Hammami chose to follow the latter, considered the more violent of the 
                                                 
241 Bouchard, Social Networks, Terrorism, and Counterterrorism, 73. 
242 Ibid. 
243 al-Amriiki, “The Story of an American Jihaadi Part One.” 
244 Ibid. 
245 Ted Dagne, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace (CRS Report No. 




two groups,247 sharing an ideology more similar to Al-Qaeda.248 According to the BBC, 
Hammami was eventually killed by members of Al-Shabab on September 12, 2013.249 
3. An SNA Approach to Omar Hammami’s Radicalization 
Analysis of social networks can be used to reveal actors (or clusters of actors) 
who are centralized in the network of radicalization and thus best placed to influence an 
individual’s behavior.250 An analysis of Omar Hammami’s social network resulted in 
uncovering influential actors who played a significant role in his radicalization. Based on 
what is known from his own writing, such analysis identified Hammami’s ties to those 
who provided him with his view of Islam and who influenced his decision to espouse 
extremist beliefs about the West. Sufficient data might have made possible the pre-
emptive identification of the person or persons who provided Hammami with instruction 
regarding weapon-making skills and access to military and guerilla fighting tactics, as 
well as those who connected him with violent extremists on the Internet.251 
Even a cursory consideration of Hammami’s social networks, based on his 
autobiography and secondary sources of information, suggests two observations: 
Hammami’s social networks needed to be evaluated over a prolonged period of time as 
opposed to analyzing a snapshot at any single point in his life; and such analysis could 
reveal relevant actors and specific events essential to Hammami’s radicalization that 
ultimately led him to Al-Shabab. With sufficient data, rigorous SNA could contribute to 
strategies intended to prevent radicalization and violent extremism in at-risk 
communities. 
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Martin Bouchard’s analysis of Hammami’s social network identified 71 
individuals who served as relevant actors in his journey to radicalization.252 This includes 
the network of his family and friends prior to his adoption of an extremist narrative, as 
well as his network in Egypt and Somalia that led to his pursuit of violent extremism. 
Each actor (or node) in the network was identified by a tie to Hammami. These actors 
included family, friends, jihadi brothers, jihadi leaders, and clergy or teachers. SNA was 
used to determine Hammami’s relationship to each actor (or cluster of actors) and how 
that relationship was used to influence Hammami’s behavior. 
Before Hammami became radicalized, his social network consisted primarily of 
his family and friends. Actors identified in this network included immediate family 
members, such as his father, first wife, and extended family in Syria, but also included 
his best friend, Culveyhouse, with whom he began his journey to radicalization. The 
kinship ties among these actors were most influential for Hammami in that some of them 
led to his understanding of the Muslim faith and connection with individuals who shared 
similar beliefs. Hammami’s friendship with Culveyhouse was an important factor in 
reinforcing his increased interest in Islamic beliefs, the first such influence that occurred 
from outside his family largely responsible for his decision to travel to gain a deeper 
understanding of Islam. This travel, in turn, resulted in an expansion of Hammami’s 
social network to actors overseas. The diffusion of ideas, influence, and information 
about the Muslim faith and Islam through this expanded social network, intensified his 
understanding of, and yearning to join, the jihadist movement. In Hammami’s 
geographically dispersed social network, actors (nodes) with high degrees of centrality 
were identified; they formed a strong bond with Hammami that resulted in highly dense 
clusters that would have been difficult to penetrate at the height of his radicalization.  
Social networks can also be bounded by location as illustrated by Hammami’s 
subnetwork (or cluster) in Mogadishu. When initially visiting the Somali city after 
leaving Egypt, Hammami connected with at least 15 contacts, 13 of whom he identified 
as jihadist brothers.253 One of these ties was to his friend from Egypt, who connected him 
                                                 
252 Bouchard, Social Networks, Terrorism, and Counterterrorism, 68. 
253 Ibid., 69. 
 60 
to an additional dense social network consisting primarily of jihadists from Somalia.254 
Hammami’s social network at this time included influential actors who were instrumental 
in his decision to radicalize and then recruit for Al-Shabab. 
Identifying the ties Hammami obtained through the Chiamboni network in 
Somalia, revealed those actors most likely responsible for his radicalization.255 This 
network of jihadist brothers included the leader of Al-Shababas, as well as one of his 
jihadist friends responsible for recruiting additional radicalized Muslims and facilitating 
their attendance at training camps where they would learn guerilla fighting-tactics.256 The 
leader of Al-Shabab later introduced Hammami to his second wife, who gave birth to 
Hammami’s first son.  
When Hammami’s friend Maldonado departed Egypt after falling ill, the only link 
in Hammami’s social network to his former life was severed, leaving him vulnerable to 
the powerful influence of his new jihadist brothers in Chiamboni, Somalia. Hammami 
was now surrounded by, and in contact with, only violent members of Al-Shabab, who 
then accepted him into the organization unconditionally. Hammami was able to ascend 
the ranks of Al-Shabab and strengthen his influence within the network. Specifically, as 
his ties strengthened with the leader of Al-Shabab, he was given a commander’s position 
in the terrorist network. Hammami’s position as a commander allowed him to recruit for 
the organization, as well as the ability to direct acts of violence against innocent civilians. 
Following his arrival in Somalia, Hammami became increasingly isolated from his wife 
and son, as well as with his family in the United States.257 
The infighting in Al-Shababthat resulted in the establishment of two separate 
factions forced Hammami to choose with which one he would associate. When faced 
with that decision, he had only his localized social network of Al-Shabab brothers and 
leaders with whom to consult.258 The result of that influence was his decision to pursue 
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the more violent jihadist path. Continuing on his path to personal jihad by joining the 
more militant branch of Al-Shabab, Hammami left Mogadishu and traveled to Baraawe, 
Somalia. He described the new network in Baraawe as a much smaller group than the 
previous Al-Shabab network, composed of only six other jihadist brothers who 
exclusively shared Islamic extremist views, sociopolitical ideologies, and the future 
vision of a violent Al-Shabab.259 
Bouchard’s research and literature review have shown that individuals are more 
susceptible to radicalization if they are isolated from moderating actors within a wider 
supporting social network.260 In Hammami’s case, he transitioned from the larger, 
dispersed Mogadishu and Chiamboni networks to the smaller, trusted, cohesive network 
of Baraawe. He severed social ties with those in the United States and with members of 
the less violent Al-Shabab group. In so doing, he sealed his fate. Hammami would later 
be killed by jihadists from the Al Shabab network of which he had originally been a 
member. 
Using the measures of SNA, one can discern that those individuals who were 
most influential in connecting Hammami to new social networks and were instrumental 
in his radicalization possessed high betweenness centrality, suggesting they served as 
brokers or bridges in connecting social networks that facilitated his journey from 
radicalization to recruitment, and eventually his membership in a smaller, more cohesive 
network inside Al-Shabab.261 The 10 actors who facilitated the shortest path between 
Hammami and all other actors in the network are listed in Table 3.262 Listed at the top of 
the table is the actor with the highest betweenness centrality followed by those with lesser 
centrality. Identifying these actors and their locations yields a representation of their 
position in Hammami’s network, revealing their importance in his overseas journey.  
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Table 3.   Top 10 Brokers in Hammami’s Social Network.263 
Relation to Hammami Actors’ Active Location 
Family (father) Daphne and Toronto 
Jihadi leader 1 Mogadishu and Chiamboni, Somalia 
Jihadi leader 2 Chiamboni and Baraawe, Somalia 
Jihadi brother 1 Chiamboni and Baraawe, Somalia 
Family (sister) Daphne and Toronto 
Best friend (high school) Daphne, Toronto, and Alexandria 
Family (first wife) Daphne, Toronto, Alexandria, and 
Mogadishu 
Jihadi leader 3 Mogadishu and Chiamboni 
Jihadi brother 2 Mogadishu and Chiamboni 
Best Friend (Egypt) Alexandria and Mogadishu 
 
Longitudinally, actors with high betweenness centrality provided Hammami 
connections to clusters over time that spanned geographic distances. His father shared 
ties to Hammami’s Syrian family and Hammami’s friends in high school. The time 
period Hammami was in contact with his father (the late 1980s to approximately 2004 to 
2005 when he moved to Alexandria, Egypt) was also the period of his radicalization 
process, during which he met many new contacts that were influential in his journey to 
jihad.264 
Ten actors served as brokers in facilitating Hammami’s transition from one 
cohesive social network to another that spanned the following geographic locations.265 
• From Daphne to Toronto (father, sister, best friend–high school, first wife) 
• From Toronto to Alexandria (best friend–high school, first wife) 
• From Alexandria to Mogadishu (first wife, best friend–Egypt)  
• From Mogadishu to Chiamboni (Jihadist leader 1, Jihadist leader 2, 
Jihadist brother 1) 
                                                 




• From Chiamboni to Baraawe (Jihadist leader 3, Jihadist brother 2)266 
Analysis of Hammami’s social network also revealed that beyond just the central 
actors who provided links into new social networks or cliques, peripheral actors had the 
significant influence over Hammami’s personal perspectives on his Muslim faith and his 
decision to participate in the jihadist movement. Among those who intensified his 
sociopolitical ideologies and what it meant to be a Muslim were Salafi Qu’ran teacher 
Daniel Maldonado and the shaykh Abu Muxammad al-Maqdasi, whom he followed 
online while in Alexandria. Hammami relied on Maldonado and the al-Maqdasi to 
legitimize his path to becoming a “pure” Muslim. In his autobiography, Hammami stated: 
I remember when I finally decided to read ‘MillatuIbraahiim,’ by Abu 
Muxammad al-Maqdasi. . . . I was so surprised to see how well the Shaykh 
was supporting his ideas with proofs. . . . Any remaining doubts in my 
head that were instilled by my early days as a’Salafi’ (i.e., neo-Salafi) had 
been removed. Jihaad is truly an individual obligation upon all of us.267 
Another influential actor in Hammami’s social network, whom he credited with 
his ability to “think outside the box,” was his high school teacher, Kathleen Hirsch.268 In 
his autobiography Hammami noted, “She gave me a passion for learning, or at least she 
increased that passion. And she had us study other religions and ideologies as well.”269 
4. Summary Analysis of Omar Hammami’s Radicalization  
The SNA conducted by Martin Bouchard illustrates how Omar Shafik 
Hammami’s changing social networks were instrumental in his radicalization process and 
eventual commitment to violent extremism. That analysis revealed specific and 
identifiable turning points when various actors in Hammami’s social network were in a 
position to exercise maximum influence over him, leading to a life of violent extremism. 
This research has further validated other terrorism analysts who have argued for 
analyzing a person’s social networks to reveal important factors in the process of 
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radicalization,270 suggesting that homeland security professionals and the U.S. 
intelligence community would benefit from applying SNA to assess an individual’s 
susceptibility to violent extremism. 
B. CASE STUDY 2: VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA’S ANTI EXTREMISM 
STRATEGY 
It is programs such as the Leadership program [that are] seen to be 
strengthening community bonds by acting as a community facilitator and 
connecting young people to community networks. 
—Victoria, Australia, Youth Services 
1. Synopsis of Victoria, Australia, Case Study 
The state of Victoria is one of Australia’s largest with a population around 5.6 
million people.271 With a surge in population pushing the state to the top of the national 
ladder, Victoria, has become one of the fastest growing and largest municipalities across 
the country.272 The increase in population is mainly attributed to internal migration and is 
consistent with the tendency for people to seek areas with relatively affordable housing, 
available education, and good job prospects. According to Australia’s Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS), young people searching for the same opportunities have been found to make up 
the larger majority of individuals migrating to Victoria. Young people living there range 
from 10–24 years old and represent 17.5% of the total population;273 however, they face 
significant disadvantages when compared to the rest of the state.274 Overall, ABS data 
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shows that one in six Australians aged 15–24 live in poverty as result of unemployment 
or a lack of education.275 
A mix of over 140 nationalities is present in Victoria, and 125 languages other 
than English are spoken there.276 Across Victoria’s state capital of Melbourne, alone, 
three in 10 people speak a language other than English at home, and diversity continues 
to grow as refugee migration transforms the city and its people.277 More cohesive and 
socially inclusive communities typically have high rates of diversity generated by 
individuals interacting with and learning from one another;278 however, national security 
and social concerns continue to be reported by Australians as among the most important 
issues facing the country.279 
Researchers examining violent extremism have suggested that a disadvantaged 
socioeconomic upbringing is a predictor of possible engagement in extremist crime.280 
Although no major terrorist attack has occurred in Australia since 2000, largely because 
of efforts that have disrupted such attacks, Australians continue to be concerned with 
their security.281 These concerns are related to a potential breakdown in socially cohesive 
communities, as well as the emergence of urban enclaves that concentrate poverty and 
disadvantage in the Australian Muslim population.282 The Australian Security 
Intelligence Organization (ASIO) has reported that several hundred Australians support 
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violent Islamist ideologies.283 To address the concern among its citizens, the Australian 
government has developed programs specifically intended “to assist young people to 
disengage from intolerant and radical ideologies and encourage positive and constructive 
participation in the community.”284 
2. Background: Victoria’s Anti-Extremism Program for Youth 
The anti-extremism project for youth in Victoria was established as a part of 
Australia’s youth mentoring program that supports the Australian government’s goal of 
administering effective community engagement to facilitate stronger and more resilient 
communities capable of resisting violent extremism.285 The program was designed for 
young people aged 12–17, referred by the Victoria Police, the education sector, and 
welfare agencies as individuals who have displayed signs of fostering hate or prejudice. 
Young people experiencing feelings of intolerance or hate have been inspired by 
messaging from individuals or groups in the community or media.286 To prevent violent 
extremists from taking advantage of vulnerable youth, program leaders seek to provide 
experiential learning and group-work to build a community’s capacity and scaffolds of 
support that ensure the inclusion of young people instead of their marginalization.287 
The program incorporates youth-work practice based on experiential adult 
learning principles as the primary method to engage at-risk individuals in Melbourne and 
greater Victoria. To foster the necessary elements for conducting youth-work, the 
program is framed by youth mentoring experts Mckee, Oldfield, and Poultney’s 
following three principles:  
• Purpose: Work is predominantly focused on achieving outcomes related to 
young people’s personal and social development (as distinct from 
academic or vocational learning). 
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• Methods: The extensive use of experiential learning and group work (as 
distinct from a prescribed curriculum and classroom teaching or individual 
casework). 
• Values: The voluntary engagement of young people with skilled adults 
transforms what is possible for young people.288 
The purpose of youth-work is to equip individuals with a range of directed 
personal and social skills.289 Peer mentors “can empower young people to use 
information and their judgment to make informed decisions.”290 Developing effective 
youth practitioners is important because they understand the structural barriers faced by 
their peers, such as policy issues surrounding their participation in civil society.291 A 
network of skilled youth practitioners can influence other young people who may also 
have a sense of inadequacy or lack of social belonging. 
The program ensures unified collaboration by engagement with communities.292 
It is guided by a socioecological framework focused on the social and physical 
environment and the resources necessary to foster personal growth,293 facilitating 
partnerships with appropriate stakeholders, and securing the resources necessary for 
success. In doing so, the program encourages “the aspirations of young people to be a 
part of the whole, a part of their community, and to make a difference.”294 
The purpose of my research was to determine whether employing SNA can 
reduce a person’s susceptibility to radicalization and violent extremism. In this case 
study, core SNA concepts were used to identify the actors (or nodes) and social ties 
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essential to the design and delivery of a specific youth intervention program. Based on 
the core principles of the program, the analysis covers social cohesion during and 
following youth mentoring that may improve collaboration, information seeking, and 
social support among group members and the community. 
3. An SNA Approach to Anti-Extremism Interventions 
Analysis of Victoria’s youth intervention program revealed a number of social 
networks necessary for the implementation and sustainment of the program, including 
partnerships among organizations, such as the police, schools and universities, and 
community-based and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). These social networks 
include person-to-person ties among youth, adult practitioners, and community and 
religious leaders based upon shared affiliations, kinships, friendships, and interests. SNA 
could have been used to determine the roles of individual actors or clusters of actors and 
the manner in which their relationships could be exploited to improve information 
sharing and social support throughout the community. 
Before youth services leaders begin the intervention process, collaboration occurs 
in social networks, consisting of agencies and organizations within the community. 
Actors identified in this network include the Victoria police, as well as members of the 
education sector and welfare agencies who want to prevent at-risk youth from 
radicalizing. Organizational connections among actors are important in the development 
of the strong and weak ties needed to establish sufficient means to support the flow of 
information required for the program’s targeted interventions. Other case studies have 
shown that family members, friends, or close acquaintances are likely to observe 
activities or behaviors that suggest an individual is being radicalized or has violent 
intent.295 Furthermore, the stigma surrounding actors tied to efforts to combat violent 
extremism and terrorism has often reduced the motivation and trust of individuals seeking 
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advice from such actors.296 For those reasons alone, youth services leaders should 
consider changing the current focus on organizational ties by including influential actors 
who might be trusted by at-risk youth to offer advice or to explain the intervention 
process.  
In this context, SNA can be used to identify influential actors who have 
demonstrated strong trust relationships with youth. In the past, interventions facilitated by 
community-identified actors have been more effective in accelerating behavioral change 
than those facilitated by actors outside the community because they know the community 
and engender trust and social capital.297 Because they come from within the community, 
they can suggest means for better addressing the needs of at-risk youth residing in the 
community. Finally, because they are embedded in the community’s social structure, 
such interventions can be sustainable, thereby increasing Victoria’s capacity to reach at-
risk youth through social mentoring provided by highly central actors.  
To locate influential leaders or champions of youth-work intervention, program 
leaders can use SNA to measure the network in-degree of an actor. That is, the number of 
times in a directed graph of a network or cluster that an actor has questions directed to 
him or her.298 Previous studies have shown that high-performance networks have resulted 
from high reciprocity, as well as in-degree relationships, among members in a network 
with high density.299 For example, research conducted using social network data to scope 
evidence-based strategies for the Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MFTC) in a 
group of California and Ohio counties showed that counties with designated leaders as 
sources of information and advice yielded greater performance in delivering foster care 
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than counties absent such leaders.300 Moreover, a type of collaborative learning 
environment in highly dense groups (with strong ties), facilitated through Community 
Development teams, could be strategically positioned between counties as a way to 
address challenges across geographically dispersed areas. As a result, the overall 
networked effort was strengthened, and the quality and quantity of implementation were 
improved.301 By following suit, the Victoria youth program can possibly reduce the time 
between interventions by relying on influential actors and the guidance they provide in 
identifying young people in the community who show signs of questionable behavior.  
The Victoria youth program highlights the importance of capacity-building in 
communities through youth-work that ensures the inclusion of young people to mitigate 
their marginalization. Capacity strengthening is accomplished through social networks 
that promote “the social development of young people and facilitate their ability to learn 
through experience from others and their environment.”302 These networks are intended 
to foster close personal relationships through bonding intentionally facilitated by face-to-
face interactions in support groups. Similar to the composition of peer networks, 
members of the youth intervention network are “people who share similar identities, 
circumstances, and contexts [that] can provide each other with trusted and relevant 
information, advice, and support when it is needed most.”303 In essence, youth services 
leaders aim to develop a social network of youth practitioners trained to facilitate and 
empower their peers and reinforce positive behavior based on the mentoring they receive. 
Dense connections are the result of trust relationships. A network with high 
density is “positively related to the likelihood that actors within the network will follow 
accepted norms and behavior.”304 Dense networks, furthermore, allow people to monitor 
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others’, which can in turn prevent them from deviant behavior.305 When people run the 
risk of losing their trusted relationships, they are more likely to resort to social norms to 
avoid losing those relationships if they do not.306 Thus, Victoria’s youth-work 
intervention program is based on creating highly dense clusters that connect previously 
isolated youth to enhance the flow of information, resources, and social ties needed for a 
healthy and positive lifestyle.  
Youth program leaders can use SNA to foster expanded network linkages by 
taking “before and after” snapshots of network connectivity. A “before” snapshot 
identifies structural holes and individuals less connected to the original peer network. A 
snapshot “after” more dense connections have been created indicates that bonding has 
exposed new clusters and identified important nodes that represent cohesive subgroups in 
the network. Measuring the ego-networks of marginal youth before and after an 
intervention can indicate whether or not their connectedness has improved in cohesive, 
positive clusters. If not, further intervention is necessary. A public health example of 
SNA-based interventions to reach individuals at risk is respondent-driven sampling 
(RDS). The RDS approach studied drug-injection users who had received a public health 
behavioral intervention. Following the intervention, users were given coupons to 
distribute in their social networks so their peers could also be made aware of the 
program.307 Leveraging social networks to impose a wider range of influence was found 
to be effective in incentivizing both the initial actor and peers to participate.308 This 
example demonstrates how incorporating SNA might also be applied during the 
implementation stage of the Victoria youth intervention program to increase support for 
those at risk of radicalization.  
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Statistics on extremist violence have shown that the absence of community 
connections and personal development opportunities for young people increase the 
likelihood of their committing crimes of violent extremism.309 Victoria’s youth project 
aimed to “strengthen community bonds by acting as a community facilitator and 
connecting young people to community networks.”310 This reflects social capital as an 
essential component to a meaningful life; that is, social networks, which “facilitate 
communication and coordination, increase individual identities and power and help to 
create a space for collective resolutions to challenges.”311 Supporting social networks 
that encourage young people to reject intolerant and radical ideologies and to participate 
in positive community activity is a potential game changer for Victoria’s youth 
intervention program. SNA can provide intervention strategies a useful method to 
identify the means to better disseminate positive messages that empower young people 
through engagement and participation in their own community. Such strategies are 
especially crucial at times when the rapid online spread of influence by violent extremists 
has exacerbated the susceptibility of those living in socially isolated and marginalized 
environments.  
4. Summary Analysis of Victoria’s Anti-Extremism Program 
This case study provided a cursory analysis of the relevance of SNA as a tool to 
enhance an anti-extremist youth intervention program in Victoria, Australia. Previous 
researchers of interventions have suggested the importance of strengthening social 
networks by closing the structural holes that prevent marginalized or isolated individuals 
from connecting to supportive clusters or communities.312 The Hammami case study 
demonstrated the power that malign social networks had on the radicalization of an 
individual, and Victoria case study provided an example of the potential contributions 
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SNA can make to benign networks to facilitate intervention with youth at risk of 
radicalization and recruitment to commit acts of terror.  
C. CASE STUDY 3: SCOTLAND TACKLING MUSLIM RADICALIZATION 
We aim to develop avenues through which all individuals are able to 
harness their particular skills for the benefit of wider society. In this way 
we actively engage with other interested collectives and organizations to 
make this vision a reality.  
—The Solas Foundation 
1. Synopsis of Glasgow, Scotland, Case Study
Scotland has a population of over five million people, 17% of whom are under 16 
years of age and 65% aged 16–64. Approximately 77,000 Scots are Muslim.313 Scottish 
Muslims share a particular sense of cohesion that has at least partially directed 
communities away from grievance-based jihadi propaganda, yet questions linger as to 
whether radicalization is truly less appealing for Scottish Muslims or simply hidden 
within closely tied communities.314 Indeed, the people of Scotland are familiar with the 
danger of violent extremism.315 Since the 2005 London transit attacks and the 2007 
attempted bombing at Glasgow Airport, Scotland has disrupted over 40 terrorist plots 
motivated by Islamist extremism, while also focusing on preventing future strikes.316 
Although the government’s approach to counterterrorism has succeeded thus far in 
protecting its citizens, the emergence and complexity of radicalization and violent 
extremism have driven Scotland to develop a new strategy focusing on long-term 
objectives for anticipating and mitigating Islamist radicalization. 
Earlier studies have shown that most Islamist terrorists had little formal religious 
Islamic training and very few of them have knowledge of what the Koran actually 
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states.317 In fact, almost 90% of violent Islamists had not received any kind of formal 
religious education.318 That was true of all the 9/11 terrorists, as well as those responsible 
for the 7/7 London attack.319 Osama Bin Laden’s academic background, for instance, 
was in engineering and business, not Islam.320 Recognizing this, Scotland launched its 
own unique counter ideology program by providing authentic and authoritative Islamic 
teaching through the Solas Foundation.  
The Solas Foundation has attempted to counter radicalization by providing 
education in Islamic scholarship based on a model of engagement and focused on 
delegitimizing the narratives of extremists who often misconstrue Islam.321 The 
principles of SNA have been applied to the following case study to illustrate how the 
Solas Foundation program outcomes can be enhanced in Scotland and to provide 
homeland security professionals in the United States a framework that undermines the 
domestic radicalization process and limits the influence and credibility of those 
attempting to incite violence.  
2. Background: The Solas Foundation’s Prevention Program 
The Solas Foundation was founded in 2009 by two Muslim scholars, Shaykh 
Ruzwan Mohammed and Shaykh Amer.322 Mohammed is a Sunni theologian who 
graduated with degrees in Geopolitics and Arabic studies from the University of 
Glasgow. Amer, heralded as one of Scotland’s most prominent and respected Muslim 
thinkers, holds a law degree from Strathclyde University and a bachelor’s degree in 
Islamic studies from the University of Wales.323 In the past, when Scottish Muslims 
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searched for information regarding mainstream Islamic law and scripture, no local 
organization was qualified to provide it.324 As a result, people in the Islamic community 
were increasingly confused about the core principles and underlying tenets of Islam. 
Thus, the Solas Foundation developed a plan to connect Scottish and British Muslim 
communities to qualified Islamic scholars with the credibility to teach and influence 
mainstream Islam.325 
The Foundation is committed “to promoting authoritative scholarship and 
learning and harnessing religious ethics to promote a better civic and social experience, 
through targeted research and learning.”326 Primarily achieved through its theological 
and social education program, Solas pioneered what it calls “authentic Islamic education 
from a Muslim scholarly perspective.”327 The program was specifically designed to 
clarify Islam through, for example, the i-Syllabus and the University Initiative, to meet 
the educational needs of various groups. The i-Syllabus is a foundational course designed 
to reach a broad range of individuals, and the University Initiative is focused specifically 
on the academic community.328 
Solas’s educators are chosen for their unique combination of both scholarship and 
personal experience, similar to the backgrounds of the Muslim scholars who founded 
Solas.329 To obtain the appropriate level of expertise, Solas requires that educators be 
“credible to young people, teach Islamic scholarship authoritatively, and explain its 
context in modern life.”330 Solas’s recruitment of educators with such expertise not only 
ensures that formal Islamic education is provided through accepted scholarship but also 
provides mentors for developing homegrown scholars. People in local communities are 
encouraged to seek advice from these vetted scholars instead of listening to outsiders 
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attempting to exert influence. Solas is thus geared toward providing credible role models 
and building leadership capacity to strengthen individuals’ knowledge base in Scottish 
and British populations.331 
Solas also works closely with multiple organizations and agencies. This includes 
partnering with Islamic and non-Islamic organizations seeking to enrich social capital by 
offering advice on how best to apply Islamic ethics in the proper context so that 
businesses can better provide services to Muslims.332 Solasalso promotes itself at 
institutions of higher learning, local mosques, and faith-based organizations (see  
Figure 6), drawing attention to credible thought leaders who openly renounce violence 
while bolstering mainstream Islam. This encourages engagement with individuals who 
can then properly discuss and debate the issues most frequently exploited by 
ideologically motivated extremists.333 
 
Figure 6.  Breakdown of Solas Intake.334 
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Because the goal of the program is prevention, not deradicalization, in terms of 
national security, program outcomes produced to date have been difficult to measure. 
Solas measures success by the “quiet changing of minds; the gradual dwindling of traffic 
to radical websites; and, ultimately, the decrease of homegrown attacks being 
attempted.”335 The program also relies on more visible and tangible measures of 
performance, such as the number of student participants, to gauge its overall 
effectiveness. After participating in Solas’s initiatives and studies, recipients reported a 
deeper appreciation of the importance of training in proper Islamic scholarship, which 
has helped to sustain them on a truly ethical path.336 
Since the creation of Solas, several communities have developed their own 
customized strategies premised on the program’s core principles to build and sustain 
ongoing support for at-risk individuals.337 These strategies have included the creation of 
networks to deal with young delinquents; establishment of a Muslim radio program to 
inform listeners about the importance of “true” Islam, engagement with mentors and 
teachers to encourage modern Islamic teaching; and, connections with individuals, 
businesses, and charities to provide advice for correcting misinterpretations of Islamic 
law throughout their communities.338 While Scotland has benefited from this program 
dedicated to providing formal mainstream Islamic education among its communities, the 
increase of Islamist movements with an ambiguous stance towards violence and the 
global appeal of Islamist terrorist groups continue to present challenges. The religious 
messaging used by these groups has amplified the need for extending proper Islamic 
scholarship throughout a wider network to better counter the narrative of radicals who 
seek to attract vulnerable, ill-informed individuals. 
The Solas Foundation disseminates word of its Islamic teachings through social 
networks that offer institutional reach to a wide range of communities in Britain. This 
reach facilitates brokered access to various academic and community institutions and 
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provides recruiting opportunities for formal educators and community leaders in a 
collaborative and culturally sensitive manner. Program leaders hope to build a cadre of 
credible role models who can provide Scotland’s Muslim communities the means to 
recognize distortions in religious teachings and to engage with individuals holding such 
views. Creating resources that allow access to scholars throughout local communities can 
build leadership capacity and provide opportunities to discuss peaceful traditions of Islam 
openly and collaboratively. 
A number of researchers have applied SNA to evaluate the effectiveness of 
organizational and leadership development networks.339 This has proven useful in 
helping organizations understand how information and resources flow through its social 
networks to influence desired outcomes. SNA could certainly be applied to the Solas 
Foundation and its community outreach to better determine and improve its effectiveness 
over time. The broad concepts of SNA have been applied in the following section to 
illuminate how key relationships and actors in local communities could contribute to 
Solas’s programs intended to reduce susceptibility to radicalization and violent 
extremism. 
3. An SNA Approach to Religious Education 
Solas offers programs and outreach intended to eliminate radical distortions of 
Islam. The Foundation’s initiatives have been designed to create sustainable community–
scholarship partnerships, build community-based knowledge in areas lacking formal 
Islamic education for outreach, increase individuals’ participation in educational 
programs, and facilitate the development of junior Islamic scholars. To evaluate and 
increase its effectiveness in connecting individuals with mentors, recognized theological 
academic institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and positive influences in the 
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Muslim communities, the Solas Foundation could benefit from the concepts and tools of 
social network analysis.  
Even a cursory consideration of the Solas Foundation’s multifaceted educational 
and community outreach campaign suggests a number of social networks essential for 
successful collaboration among various individuals and organizations. At the individual 
level, this includes ties with scholars and teachers, religious and community leaders, and 
others active in the community. The Foundation has ties with Muslim communities that 
span mosques, academic institutions, nonprofit organizations, businesses, service 
providers, and local social groups. These relationships can self-organize (or be 
deliberately organized) through strong and weak ties into clusters and networks that 
provide cultural support by sharing information and resources. Although many of these 
clusters and networks have already formed organically, they have not been analyzed 
using the tools of social network analysis. The Solas Foundation might benefit by 
employing this sort of analysis to determine which actors and relevant ties could be most 
effective in connecting wider networks of outreach and support among Scottish and 
British Muslim communities.  
To create sustainable community–scholarship partnerships, Solas personnel seek 
to connect social networks of organizations and individuals. Organizational nodes include 
institutions of higher education, mosques and religious institutions, community groups, 
and businesses. Individual nodes include imams, Solas-identified mentors and educators, 
Muslim youth, family and friends, business associates, and university faculty and 
students. Both formal organizational and informal social ties help to facilitate and extend 
the dissemination of Solas initiatives. Understanding the strength and nature of these ties 
is also important. To counter the ideological narratives of extremists that distort Islamic 
teachings, recent efforts have emphasized the need to enhance trust, as well as to foster 
cooperation and partnerships in programs delivering community outreach and 
engagement.340 
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A 2016 investigation by a Scottish Non-governmental organization revealed that 
leaders from the Glasgow Central Mosque, Scotland’s largest mosque, had funded 
Islamic extremist groups in 2011,341 resulting in tense relationships between the new but 
younger leadership and older Muslims in the community who no longer believed the 
mosque was offering traditional Islamic teaching.342 Trust is a fundamental aspect of 
strong social ties that can contribute to both a sense of security and effectance in a social 
network.343 SNA can help identify the strength of ties, as well as the existence of 
structural holes that represent gaps between clusters. By leveraging weak ties, clusters 
could be connected through nodes with high betweenness centrality, thereby increasing 
the size and cohesiveness of supporting social networks. 
SNA can be used to determine which actors possess the right attributes and are 
best placed to have the most influence in promoting connectedness and cohesion in a 
network. In previous studies, such actors have often emerged from the informal networks 
or clusters that underpin formal networks and are often not easily identifiable.344 
Informal networks are frequently formed through homophily centered on shared 
attributes, such as social norms, values, and backgrounds.345 A case study in which SNA 
was applied to better understand how to engage Australian communities in climate policy 
advocacy showed that network entry (into both formal and informal networks) “speaks to 
the socially inclusive or exclusive nature of a group.”346 Although the Solas Foundation 
has facilitated outreach and engagement through formal institutions and networks in the 
community, an opportunity may exist to better leverage informal networks to close 
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structural holes that limit overall network growth and the effectiveness of the stated goals 
of the program.  
Programs similar in intent to those of the Solas Foundation, also founded by 
Muslim scholars, have shown that integrating with informal networks, such as trust 
networks, is useful in countering extremist narratives meant to influence the thinking of 
individuals living in vulnerable environments.347 Trust networks have been defined as 
“ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which 
people set valued, consequential long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the 
malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others.”348 In other words, trust networks are highly 
dense networks formed through bonding, which denotes tightly knit groups or clusters.349 
Networks with high density can decrease the perceived risks and costs associated with 
collaboration, an important factor for collective action.350 Network density can help 
explain why “when like-minded people deliberate as an organized group, the general 
opinion shifts toward extreme versions of their common beliefs.”351 
In a 2004 study of global Salafi jihad (GSJ), a small cluster of young men, who 
regularly met at a mosque and subsequently lived together in an apartment, eventually 
radicalized after months of excessive social interaction with its most extreme 
members.352 Such cluster formation and bonding can just as readily promote positive 
behavior and outcomes. Solas Foundation leaders could benefit from evaluating dense 
networks and highly central actors to broker or bridge collaboration between groups or 
clusters; moreover, additional groups can be influenced from this brokering capability. 
Accessing cohesive subgroups, or dense clusters brokered by central actors in the 
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network, can help to increase collaboration and increase the flow of information 
throughout the Solas network, providing a platform for discussion of diverse opinions in 
geographically dispersed locations. The end result could be a stronger knowledge base 
and growing capacity in the community for resisting radicalization to Islamist extremism.  
An opportunity for the Solas Foundation to extend its influence through social 
networks is exemplified by efforts to forge closer ties with the Scotland Government’s 
Development trusts, which are community-run agencies, formed to develop social 
cohesion and to meet the economic, social, environmental, and cultural needs of Scottish 
communities.353 A report released by Education Scotland in partnership with the 
Development Trust Association Scotland (DTAS) concluded that the work of 
Development Trusts strongly contributed to local economies, as well as supporting the 
development of priorities for the Scottish government. Convenor of Mull and Iona 
Community Trust and Chair of DTAS, Sandy Brunton, stated: 
The outcomes from this study reflect the hard work and commitment of 
the trusts involved, but has a wider significance for the community-led 
regeneration network as a whole. . . . We are delighted that our community 
engagement and involvement has been highlighted as a key strength of the 
organisation as two of our key aims are to build community cohesion and 
reduce social isolation.354 
By forging closer ties with actors, such as the Development Trusts, Solas can provide an 
opportunity to increase individuals’ participation in program initiatives and build 
community-based knowledge in areas lacking formal Islamic education for outreach.  
The Solas Foundation emphasizes the importance of capacity building in 
communities through vetted scholars who make certain that issues relating to Islam and 
Muslims are approached from “an authoritative theological and social policy frame of 
reference.”355 This capacity is developed through social networks “to educate a new 
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generation of community leaders, teachers and advocates who will then be able to 
strengthen the British Muslim community.”356 These networks are intended to develop 
leaders and form dense groups or clusters around them so that young Muslims who 
become knowledgeable in mainstream Islamic scholarship can persuade others who are 
not properly educated and trained. 
One way SNA can help track the development of junior scholars is by measuring 
their in-degree, a simple influence measure that counts how many directed relationships 
indicate whether or not an actor is highly sought for advice.357 SNA studies evaluating 
leadership networks showed that advice networks are important when the barriers to 
change are technical.358 That is to say, when someone discloses they do not understand 
the behavior, then advice or expertise is needed to influence leadership. For Solas, 
increasing the widespread acceptance of Islamic learning is dependent on developing a 
network of individuals having the necessary scholarship credentials to provide advice that 
can offset distorted radical Islamist narratives. For instance, one student in the program 
asked Solas educators to clear up the topic of suicide bombing. The student said, “I am 
confused about this topic for I have heard prominent individuals speak in favor of it even 
though I know most scholars do not allow it.”359 SNA could help the Solas Foundation 
identify which actors exhibit the most influence based on their in-degree centrality in a 
specific network to increase the impact of educational engagement.  
Solas can also monitor and measure the progress of aspiring educators’ 
development and their in-degree influence, determining which actors are becoming more 
or less central in their social networks. Other metrics for analyzing in-degree 
relationships also provide for the measurement of how influential particular advice-
seekers are.360 A person whose advice is sought by many other highly influential people 
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can have a higher score of in-degree centrality in the network.361 By evaluating these 
metrics, Solas may be able to improve methods to strengthen the capacity of British and 
Scottish Muslim communities, explicitly tracking changes in perceptions and attitudes 
across the network as a result of a scholar’s influence. 
4. Summary Analysis of Glasgow’s Prevention Program 
The consideration of SNA in this case study illustrates the role social networks 
play in affecting program outcomes for the Solas Foundation. SNA might help Solas 
enhance the design, implementation, and sustainment of its community education and 
outreach processes. Bearing this in mind, homeland security experts in the United States 
may be able to advance community-based programs to counter the narratives of violent 
extremism and terrorism with the goal of reducing a community’s vulnerability to 
religion-based extremism. 
D. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS CONCLUSION 
This section has focused on the role SNA can play in a person’s trajectory 
towards radicalization and the development of strategies for undercutting an individual’s 
and community’s potential susceptibility to radical narratives that could lead them to 
violence or terrorism. It began with a general overview of an individual and various 
communities at risk, and then moved onto an exploratory analysis and interpretation of 
whether the application of the SNA methodology may have prevented the process of 
radicalization, or was useful for crafting and enhancing strategies in community 
engagement and intervention programs. The case studies allowed this research to refine 
the theoretical framework from the literature, offering a strong foundation for developing 
theoretical assumptions, based on the framing of relationships within bounded social 
networks in vulnerable communities. As such, a community is given the means to 
identify the social networks that can potentially increase or decrease a community’s 
susceptibility to the changing ideological narratives that promote radicalization and 
recruitment to violent groups. By developing a THIRA strategy based on SNA principles, 
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homeland security and intelligence officials may be more effective in reducing a 
community’s overall vulnerability and increasing its resilience to anticipate and mitigate 
the threat of violence and terrorism.  
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V. APPLICATION: INCORPORATING SOCIAL NETWORK 
ANALYSIS IN THIRA 
The previous chapter contained an analysis of the role social networks play in the 
radicalization process of an individual, as well as in community outreach and engagement 
programs intended to counter violent extremism. The purpose of this chapter is to 
incorporate the lessons learned in the case studies cited into FEMA’s existing THIRA 
process for assessing the vulnerability of a community threatened by radicalization and 
violent extremism. 
Although the interpersonal relationships of violent extremists have not been 
extensively studied, insights derived from the few studies that have explored the social 
networks of specific radicalized individuals have proven helpful in suggesting methods to 
reduce the vulnerability of communities at risk from radicalization and violent 
extremism. Without understanding the strength and pattern of ties within the community, 
pinpointing the information and resources necessary to prevent someone from 
radicalizing is difficult. Further, investigators struggle to identify relevant actors, both 
those at risk and those seeking to radicalize them. Therefore, the case study analyses in 
the previous chapter suggests that SNA may prove to be a valuable tool and suggests how 
it might be incorporated into the nation’s Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk 
Assessment process.  
All three case studies dealt with the process of radicalization and revealed how 
social networks play a role in the susceptibility of an individual and community to violent 
extremism. The Omar Hammami case study lies at one end of the spectrum in which an 
individual was successfully radicalized. The case studies in Scotland and Australia lie at 
the other end of the spectrum with intervention and educational services successfully 
used as tools for building a community’s capacity to disrupt the radicalization process. 
The analyses of all three case studies provided a new perspective on relationships in 
bounded social networks of at-risk communities that could be incorporated into FEMA’s 
threat and risk assessment framework as the means of identifying and mitigating against 
relationships that place susceptible individuals at risk. 
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A. THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY’S THIRA 
PROCESS  
Incorporating the concepts of SNA into the THIRA framework first requires a 
description of the current process. Established through Presidential Policy Directive-8: 
National Preparedness System, the THIRA process is the DHS/FEMA policy that guides 
communities through a capabilities assessment to identify and assess their vulnerabilities. 
FEMA’s Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201 describes THIRA’s four-step 
process for communities to identify and prioritize the threats and hazards they face.362 
The latter steps of the framework outline a strategic process for risk managers to identify 
and target capability gaps, estimate capabilities and resources, and then apply the results 
to address and close capability gaps effectively.363 According to the CPG 201 Guide, the 
four-step process is as follows: 
• Identify the Threats and Hazards of Concern. Based on a combination 
of past experience, forecasting, expert judgment, and other available 
resources, communities identify a list of the threats and hazards of primary 
concern to the community. 
• Give the Threats and Hazards Context. Communities describe the 
threats and hazards of concern, showing how they may affect the 
community. 
• Establish Capability Targets. Communities assess each threat and 
hazard in context to develop a specific capability target for each relevant 
core capability. The capability target defines success for that capability. 
Prevention core capabilities include Planning; Public Information and 
Warning; and Operational Coordination; Intelligence and Information 
Sharing; Interdiction and Disruption; Screening, Search, and Detection; 
and Forensics and Attribution.364 
• Apply the Results. Communities estimate the required resources per core 
capability to meet the capability targets. 
THIRA policy also emphasizes the need to use a whole-of-community approach 
to facilitate the process. The whole community, which includes a network of all levels of 
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government, private sector, nonprofit and faith-based organizations, and the public,365 is 
the underlying principle in DHS and FEMA policies that aims to strengthen the means by 
which homeland security professionals capture societal capacities for building 
relationships and learning more about the complexities of their community.366 As cited in 
this research, however, no method currently exists to adequately instruct a community in 
capturing and building such capacities. As part of a new assessment framework, SNA 
may significantly contribute to this effort as part of FEMA’s Threat and Hazard 
Identification and Risk Assessment process. 
B. A NATIONAL SOCIAL NETWORK APPROACH  
The goal of the new assessment framework is threefold: to identify communities 
lacking relevant social network information that would contribute to social outreach; to 
enhance trust between government and communities to foster cooperation and 
partnerships; and to link the right expertise, skills, and resources to help at-risk 
communities increase the number of proficient stakeholders and fora in which 
community members can work safely with their government to develop targeted support 
strategies. This framework is intended to support a new homeland security strategy to 
identify and assess the vulnerability of communities through an analysis of their social 
networks. In doing so, a determination can be made of which actors and relationships best 
lend themselves to opportunities for the government to develop, deliver, and sustain 
efforts for preventing the root causes of extremist ideologies.  
The proposed THIRA SNA process begins with the identification of communities 
that present as high-risk areas for radicalization based on the analysis of their social 
networks. Geography plays a central role in the definition of each community, but 
determining which are “at-risk” means identifying the social networks that may have the 
potential to foster radical ideologies. As cited in the literature review and all three case 
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studies, a critical first step to understanding the health and well-being of communities is 
assessing social capital and the extent to which members of a community feel connected 
through trust relationships to leaders, neighbors, and local government or display signs of 
marginalization. Although Scotland and Australia are characterized by highly cohesive 
communities, their citizens continue to question their security in the face of a perceived 
breakdown in social capital and cohesion as promulgated through radical narratives. 
Analyzing a social network’s density, structure, and characteristics, as well as structural 
holes that represent gaps between clusters in a community network, can help enhance an 
understanding of community resilience. By taking a network approach when assessing a 
community’s vulnerability to radicalization and recognizing the critical link between 
social connectivity and individual perceptions of safety and well-being, the THIRA 
process can be used to determine areas at greatest risk. 
All three case studies demonstrate that dramatic changes in the behavior of 
individuals can often be traced to the social networks to which they belong. A hidden 
pattern of relationships intent on marginalizing susceptible individuals can potentially 
limit the development of social capital and result in radicalization, a claim supported by 
the Australia case study. As recommended earlier, efforts, such as Australia’s Youth 
Mentoring Program might benefit from interventions designed to facilitate the formation 
of highly dense clusters and bonding in youth worker social networks to promote social 
capital and positive behavioral outcomes. As discussed in the literature review, 
establishing social ties in a population lacking density is difficult.367 Moreover, the less 
cohesive a community, the less access an individual has to the strong ties needed to 
provide a sense of safety in social networks.368 Integrating a formal visualization 
process—social network analysis—into the initial steps of THIRA, could enable a 
community to determine the structure and characteristics of specific social networks by 
measuring density -the ratio of actual ties to possible ties - and various other metrics. As 
was shown in the Scotland and Australia case studies, communities lacking strong social 
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support systems are subject to higher levels of marginalization and isolation among their 
populations that can increase the community’s vulnerability to radicalization.  
Once an at-risk community is identified, the next step is to assess the context of 
the threat and to determine how it may affect community resilience. As this thesis has 
shown, the emergence of strong and weak ties across the social network of an individual 
over time (and geographic location) can reveal clusters of radicalization or indications of 
trust relationships with known radical elements. As was the case in Omar Hammami’s 
trajectory to radicalization, his informal ties to family, friends, and classmates were most 
influential in shaping his initial perceptions of Islamic and Muslim beliefs, but his social 
and religious alienation drew him closer to a jihadi network, whose members also shared 
experiences of social, economic, and political discrimination. In Victoria, Australia 
evaluating the effect of creating dense clusters through bonding, facilitated by 
interventions with isolated youth, might be accomplished by measuring network 
connectedness before and after an intervention.  
Using visual mapping tools to identify where structural holes between clusters 
exist in community social networks can potentially reduce vulnerability by providing ties 
to connect networks and enhance social capital among community members. Given the 
evolving threat from radicalization, inserting SNA methodology into the THIRA process 
at the onset can allow analysts to measure and graphically depict inter-relationships and 
gaps between clusters to anticipate the likelihood at-risk individuals may be radicalized 
or recruited. In this way, a community is provided the opportunity to mitigate the process 
of radicalization by creating a strategy of intervention and support.  
After a community identifies internal areas of vulnerability, a capability target can 
be developed (such as mentoring and counseling services) to address the vulnerabilities 
and to assess the capacity for delivering each capability by determining gaps in support 
and resources that may inhibit achievement of desired outcomes. In many cases, no 
formal or informal network may be in place to provide essential social services, protect a 
population from intimidation, and to evaluate whether terrorist organizations and their 
actors are gaining legitimacy. As in the Australia case study, formal organizational ties 
with mosques and informal ties formed through homophily may have provided the most 
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direct means to counter extremist narratives meant to manipulate individuals at risk. 
Assessing the intersection between formal and informal networks helps to identify 
opportunities to establish strong bridging or brokering capabilities that enable a 
community to provide adequate support or advice on topics related to the prevention of 
violent extremism. These opportunities also include leveraging powerful actors or 
supportive clusters to advance counter radicalization efforts. This approach might 
enhance the success of the THIRA process and possibly decrease or eliminate the flow of 
recruits to violent extremist organizations while increasing community resilience. 
SNA offers the potential to assess the collaborative and cooperative nature of 
individuals, groups, or organizations engaged in counter radicalization strategies at the 
community level. Drawing on interviews and surveys, a community can apply SNA to 
identify areas of weakness that prevent effective communication and the flow of 
resources through collaborative partnership. An objective assessment can provide the 
means to better understand the collaboration network as a whole, enabling communities 
to improve prevention capabilities, as well as to achieve their identified capability targets 
by recognizing which actors are best positioned to close structural holes and thus improve 
overall network effectiveness. 
In the case studies from Scotland and Australia, many potential advantages of 
SNA emerged. Among these was the ability to recognize individuals or groups best suited 
to help identify the desires and needs of a community, obstacles to change, and favorable 
motivators for transformation. Each case study demonstrated the importance of 
developing strategies that forged closer ties with actors who engendered trust and social 
capital within the community network. Identified actors, both those central to, and 
peripheral in, social networks of interest, were used to promote the socially inclusive 
nature of their communities. In the case of Omar Hammami, peripheral but trusted actors 
beyond those most central to his original social network had the most influence in his 
radicalization process.  
Measuring the strength of ties within social networks requires asking vulnerable 
individuals, “With whom do you discuss problems?” The answer identifies actors or 
nodes perceived by the subject as being trustworthy, credible, and communicative, often 
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indicating high in-degree centrality. By asking such questions, a community can increase 
its ability to nurture relationships and build trust within the THIRA network by defining 
shared objectives with community gatekeepers who are graphically mapped as having 
high in-degree centrality. This type of analysis may also address the concerns of civil-
society actors, who have often felt alienated by the prevention measures that were 
imposed, regardless of whether existing relationships with government or the community 
are good, poor, or barely existent.369 
In addition, a community that develops an engagement strategy by targeting 
actors with in-degree centrality can help contrast conflicting narratives and trust 
relationships between law enforcement and healthy cultural fora on the one hand and 
extremists on the other. Strong ties with influential actors in local communities can build 
trust within isolated clusters that may encourage individuals to volunteer sensitive 
information because they feel safe enough to do so.370 This assertion was illustrated in 
the Hammami case study when his sister declared, “The fact that my brother is a 
terrorist—it’s not something you can talk to anyone about.”371 Even though she abhorred 
violence, the sister chose not to disclose Hammami’s behavior for fear of retribution. 
Through the latter steps of the THIRA process, capabilities, such as intelligence and 
public information sharing can be strengthened by forging closer ties with community-
identified actors to help refine the means by which messages are conveyed. Targeted 
engagement will also allow residents in vulnerable communities to more easily access 
help and find ways to seek appropriate counsel for themselves or those close to them.  
The THIRA process provides the means for communities to estimate their 
capabilities and to determine resources required to close capability gaps. This assessment 
involves determining whether constraints exist in delivering capabilities, such as public 
information, to make decisions about the allocation of limited resources. According to the 
literature, networks among CVE-related partners have often faced barriers, including 
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resource constraints, knowledge gaps, and underdeveloped peer-to-peer contacts.372 The 
examination of Scotland’s program to prevent individuals from engaging in misconceived 
Islamist-based violence revealed how identifying the existence of structural holes was 
critical to understanding knowledge gaps and behavioral constraints in the network. This 
was also evident in the analysis of Australia’s community engagement activities, 
administered through its youth prevention program, where the identification of cohesive 
subgroups was essential for establishing efficient communication channels and closing 
structural holes by embedding highly centralized nodes in the network.  
This same type of evaluation can be applied to the THIRA process for extending 
resources to disconnected clusters. Communities can map isolated networks that limit 
overall network growth and effectiveness and then leverage groups or nodes (actors) with 
high betweenness centrality to create or strengthen brokering or bridging capabilities to 
close structural holes. Moreover, these same actors can serve as essential linksto 
strengthen trust between individuals or groups, increasing the speed and flow of 
information and influence. Because of the diverse nature of communities and threats 
across the US, highly centralized actors with access to cohesive subgroups, or dense 
clusters, are in a stronger position to determine which criteria will be most useful in a 
resource allocation strategy. As a result, communities can customize prevention 
capabilities and apply resources that define them, increase the size and cohesiveness of 
supporting social networks, and promote and extend positive behavior throughout 
marginalized networks, thereby reducing vulnerability to radicalized violence. 
C. A PRACTITIONER’S APPLICATION 
The analysis presented above attempted to justify the utility of incorporating SNA 
in the THIRA process through the framework discussed. Commercially available 
software applications provide the tools for conducting social network analysis, however, 
practitioners require an understanding of the process wherein analysts and policy makers 
generate strategies for selecting the appropriate capabilities to address their assessment of 
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the threats and opportunities. The following section provides a brief overview of this 
process.  
Prior to implementing specific capabilities, the analyst conducts an assessment of 
the community’s needs, influences, and opportunities for reducing the risk of 
radicalization. This includes mapping the network boundaries of a community and the 
population of interest, and the social networks of individuals and organizations present. 
Social networks identified to implement capabilities ideally include like-minded actors 
with common relationships to establish, strengthen, and maintain a coordinated and 
collaborative THIRA network.  
SNA is used to assess the social capital available in a community, to identify 
isolated or marginalized individuals or groups, to mobilize specific resources and 
information, and then to apply the capabilities necessary to address vulnerable 
communities through community engagement and interventions. This analysis leverages 
face-to-face interviews, publicly available information (including social media scraping), 
and surveys to inform target capabilities. The outcome of this effort is a stronger 
understanding of the threat environment and the social networks needed to offset it. The 
THIRA team uses this analysis to identify at risk communities, to understand barriers to 
the implementation of counter radicalization strategy, to identify community leaders, 
partners, and gatekeepers who can help develop and/or implement relevant core 
capabilities, and to gather any data needed to anticipate and preempt an individual’s 
radicalization, thereby strengthening a community’s overall resilience to violent 
extremism.  
To illustrate how SNA can be integrated into the THIRA assessment process, I 
will explore the application of my proposed framework to the community of Lewiston, 
Maine’s hypothetical assessment of the Information and Intelligence Sharing core 
capability. As prescribed in the National Prevention Framework, the Information and 
Intelligence Sharing core capability is intended to: 
• identify, develop, and provide timely, accurate, and actionable information 
resulting from the planning, direction, collection, exploitation, processing, 
analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and feedback of available 
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information concerning physical and cyber-threats to the United States, its 
people, property, or interests; and 
• involves the effective implementation of the intelligence cycle and 
information integration process by local, state, tribal, territorial, 
and Federal intelligence entities, the private sector, the public, and 
international partners, as appropriate, to develop situational 
awareness on the actor(s), method(s), means, weapon(s), or 
target(s) related to preventing terrorist threats within the United 
States.373 
The description above guides Lewiston’s application of social network principles 
to assess its Information and Intelligence Sharing capabilities, which translates into the 
development of the specific capability actors, methods, means, weapons, or targets, as 
well as the identification of potential impacts from the threat of radicalization and violent 
extremism. In my notional scenario, following a SNA assessment, Lewiston can then 
develop customized capability targets to achieve desired outcomes. Notional examples of 
capability targets are provided below. 
• Share all relevant actionable information and intelligence across all levels 
of government and other stakeholders to anticipate and identify emerging 
and or imminent threats through the intelligence cycle. Within hours of 
receipt of actionable intelligence, share actionable information, develop 
and disseminate appropriate classified or unclassified products, and submit 
terrorism-related information and/or suspicious activity reports to all 
appropriate authorities.  
• Ensure federal, state, local, and private sector partners possess or have 
access to a mechanism to submit terrorism-related information and 
suspicious activity reports to law enforcement for a statewide event.374 
Through the application of social network analysis, Lewiston can aggregate social 
network data to provide an initial understanding of the relevant social networks in the 
community (both malign networks and those benign networks that might build positive 
social capital for community members). The network data collected and analyzed 
determines relevant groupings of actors or clusters of actors (or distinct subgroups) and 
the relationships that are critical for implementing the capability targets identified. The 
aggregation process can provide Lewiston with structural information about the network 
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and known disaggregation of the network through the presence of structural holes. 
Furthermore, the analysis would provide information on individual and subgroup 
relationships including individual and subgroup relative positional importance within 
social networks of interest. Unfortunately, risks accompany using SNA when obtaining 
information from social networks, such as the collection of personally identifiable 
information (PII), which I will address later in this section. 
To define the structure of the network and locate the appropriate actors or 
clustering and relationships, the analyst assigns weights to nodes (or actors) and ties (or 
edges). Once the structure of the network is graphically depicted, Lewiston can determine 
the appropriate measures for implementation. Based on the capability targets above, 
Lewiston would apply the following weights to target-specific nodes and relationships to 
achieve the identified capability targets through appropriate means. Examples of potential 
aggregated weights to nodes and ties are provided in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Proposed SNA Capabilities Assessment for Practitioner.375 




• Positional or relational data 
• Additional data on 
attributes 
• Nodes representing speed 
or distance 
• Actors or subgroups 
communicating through 
egos spanned across 
structural holes 
• Interest in cohesive nodes 




• Relational data 
• Ties’ (edge) weights 
representing distance 
• Actors who have 
memberships in 
multiple subgroups 
• Interest in clustered 
relationships  
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 Aggregate Weighted Nodes Aggregate Weighted Ties 
Examples Examples Positional data 
• Influential power of an 
actor or cluster towards all 
other nodes in the network 
• Timed rate of sharing or 
exchange of information or 
intelligence to other actors, 
such as law enforcement, 
Fusion Centers, community 
members, to every other 
actor in the network (i.e. 
determining the speed of 
communications in relation 
to path length). 
• Numeric sum of meetings 
and/or events an actor 
attends 
• Numeric sum an actor 
initiates or directs contact 
(emails, phone calls, etc.) 





• Expenditures for 
relaying intelligence 
or information 
between more than 
one location 
• Number of contact 
shared between two 
actors 






• Degree Centrality 
• Closeness Centrality 
• Betweenness Centrality 
• Eigenvector Centrality 
• Individual ties 
• Organizational ties 
Example Outputs • Node measures indicating 
actor’s position with regard 
to the data defined 
• Data on actor positions 
indicating subgroups or 
nodes positions and degree 
of activity among and 
between actors. 






• Data on actor or 
subgroup positions 
specifying minimal or 
maximum rate of 
interactions between 
actors or clustered 
subgroups 
A modified example based on Sara Sterling’s model. 
 
As illustrated in Table 4, by assessing the nature of the actors and relationships 
and assigning social network measures, Lewiston can be provided an opportunity to 
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evaluate and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Information and Intelligence 
Sharing capabilities. In this case, Lewiston may use SNA to identify whether the network 
is fragmented by revealing the links between clusters or subgroups, and whether clusters 
have emerged or are being by connected by specific actors with ties to several groups. In 
addition, Lewiston could measure network density to identify cohesive subgroups in the 
network, suggesting which nodes sets may be easily leveraged or otherwise exploited to 
facilitate the information integration process. Actors mapped with high centrality may be 
targets for the Information and Intelligence Sharing capabilities. They may include 
former trusted members of sub-groups of interest who know a great deal about these 
subgroups, but who no longer have a role in them or a position of direct authority. 
Finally, the evaluation of flow of communication or information would determine which 
nodes or actors in the network are not suitable for receiving classified or sensitive 
information. In the future, Lewiston would have the social network tools in place to 
conduct an ongoing assessment and measure of effectiveness of its counter radicalization 
efforts over time. 
D. SNA RISKS TO INFORMATION PRIVACY 
The use of SNA is not, however, without risks. Obtaining PII and using this data 
to populate social network matrices (using named actors’ attributes and characteristics) 
and topologies can create issues related to privacy, ethics, and civil liberties.376 The 
adoption of mobile and electronic technologies and the investigation of crimes and 
extremist messaging propagated through Internet-based applications have added 
complexity and risk to the management of a person’s information privacy.377 More 
broadly, the surveillance of social media and how it affects First and Fourth Amendment 
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rights have increased scrutiny of government agencies with duties of public safety and 
homeland security.378 
The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) established 28 Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23 as the national standard to ensure that intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies’ “submission, access, storage, and dissemination of criminal 
intelligence information conform to the privacy and constitutional rights of individuals, 
including the group and organization to which they may belong.”379 To assist federal, 
local, state, and tribal intelligence and security agencies in determining whether they are 
in compliance with these standards, and to implement applicable privacy, civil rights, and 
civil liberties protections in their policies and procedures, the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s (DOJ’s) Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) Criminal 
Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC), in partnership with DHS/DOJ’s Fusion 
Process Technical Assistance Program, developed the Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties Compliance Verification for the Intelligence Enterprise.380 The document 
prescribes a suggested methodology for agencies to conduct adequate records review, 
including the opportunity to identify weaknesses and gaps that should be included when 
performing their review.381 The guidance also includes “an awareness of processes and 
procedures that could affect the intelligence and information sharing environment, such 
as the handling of controlled unclassified information (CUI) among various federal 
agencies.”382 Thus, to implement the use of SNA as a tool for addressing the prevention 
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of radicalization and violence, and to encourage a community’s participation, the THIRA 
program should ensure its use is established in accordance with homeland security and 
intelligence agency policies that comply with national standards and existing guidance as 
a normal course of business.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the common characteristics of social network analysis, using a 
multiple case study method, provided the necessary information to determine how these 
characteristics may play a role in the new THIRA approach for assessing a community’s 
vulnerability to radicalized violence. Mostly, this research has shown this to be a 
complex undertaking, analyzing hidden yet influential social relationships within a 
community that can ensure the successful prevention of radicalization before the process 
even begins. Each community is unique, and each will have its own set of needs, barriers, 
and challenges, but incorporating SNA into the process of THIRA may fill critical gaps 
in our understanding of radicalization and violent extremism that enhance our ability to 
improve individual and community resilience.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The multiple case study approach used in this research has yielded findings that 
ultimately answer the question: How can Social Network Analysis (SNA) reduce the 
vulnerability of a community at risk of radicalization and violent extremism if used within 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) THIRA process?  
The assertions made at the beginning of this paper were that 1) a gap exists in 
counter radicalization and violent extremism studies and policies with regard to assessing 
a community’s vulnerability through an analysis of their social networks; 2) a means is 
needed to qualitatively and quantitatively measure the interpersonal relationships of 
violent extremists and at-risk communities by incorporating SNA in the THIRA process; 
and 3) SNA can be used or acknowledged in homeland security organizations’ prevention 
assessment tools and methods for pre-empting radicalization and violence. To determine 
how this may be accomplished, the following two sub-questions were answered to 
provide recommendations derived from this research followed by suggestions for future 
research and next steps in the field of countering or preventing violent extremism. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. How Can SNA Be Incorporated in the THIRA Process to Help 
Prevent Radicalization and Violent Extremism? 
The case studies in Chapter IV provided an analysis of an individual’s 
radicalization process, as well as intervention and engagement programs based on core 
SNA principles illustrated in the existing literature. The research shows that for a variety 
of reasons, incorporating SNA at the onset can help determine an individual’s and 
community’s vulnerability to radicalization and violent extremism, as well as a 
community’s ability to prevent or counter such threats. As described in Chapter V, 
communities that lack a high degree of social capital and social support systems were 
subject to higher levels of marginalization and isolation among their populations that can 
increase their vulnerability to radicalization. Moreover, the emergence of strong and 
weak ties across the social network over time (and geographic location) can reveal 
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clusters of radicalization or indications of trust relationships with known radical 
elements, as well as actors who are best positioned for influencing those clusters or 
relationships. From those findings, an assessment framework was proposed outlining how 
communities can integrate SNA methodology into the THIRA process. A community’s 
ability to measure social network density, centrality, structure, and characteristics was 
determined to be beneficial if included in the four-step process of THIRA. It was then 
suggested how a community could mitigate the threat of radicalization by developing and 
targeting core capabilities that may build social capital and trust, increase efficiency and 
availability of information sharing, and provide social support to improve resilience.  
2. In What Ways Do Current Homeland Security Organizations 
Acknowledge or Use SNA in their Prevention Assessment Tools and 
Methods? 
Research discussed in the literature review focused on determining the 
effectiveness of SNA as a tool for homeland security professionals to better understand 
and disrupt criminal, gang, and terrorist networks. In addition to this research, a number 
of initiatives have been undertaken by homeland security professionals that can 
illuminate the incorporation of SNA into existing prevention assessment tools and 
methods. The FBI, for example, currently uses SNA as a technique to aid in conspiracy 
investigations383 and to solve the most prevalent crimes in communities.384 Using social 
networking techniques, police identify the connections among group members of local 
gang, criminal, or terrorist cells and focus on actors who would potentially be most 
knowledgeable about, or influential in, the activity in question. By analyzing areas, such 
as “the social distance between individuals and groups, the direction in which exchanges 
flow between people, the relative influence of various group members, the suspect’s 
centrality to the group, and the degree of cohesiveness of the group,”385 the investigator 
                                                 
383 Roger H. Davis, “Social Network Analysis: An Aid in Conspiracy Investigations,” Law 
Enforcement Bulletin 50, no. 12 (December 1981): 11–19, https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/ 
abstract.aspx?ID=81001.  
384 Johnson, “Social Network Analysis: A Systematic Approach for Investigating.”  
385 “Social Network Analysis: An Aid in Conspiracy Investigations.” 
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might diminish the extent to which actors may initiate conspiratorial involvement in 
supporting either criminal or terrorist activity. 
As analytic hubs, intelligence fusion centers also use information from social 
networks for countering violent extremism and protecting local communities from violent 
crime. Through the use of technologies and community reporting vehicles, such as social 
media, suspicious activity reporting (SAR), license plate readers, and facial recognition 
technologies,386 intelligence fusion centers conduct association analyses of critical 
investigative or assessment variables to examine the relationships among individuals 
suspected of involvement in criminal or terrorist activity and patterns that emerge as the 
variables are linked in the analyses.387 Qualitative and quantitative research methods are 
also incorporated to draw conclusions described in either a narrative or scale of 
measurement form.388 As a result, intelligence fusion centers are able to support state and 
local partners’ ability to detect behaviors and indicators of potential terrorist and criminal 
threats they could encounter in the field by systematically analyzing connections and 
characteristics derived from malicious social networks.389 This research has shown that 
SNA is a useful methodology for enhancing existing homeland security organizations’ 
prevention assessment methods and tools. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis used case studies to explore the ways in which SNA could serve as a 
valid tool for programs intended to prevent or diminish radicalization and violent 
extremism. The thesis provided several characteristics of susceptible communities’ social 
networks, as well as examples of how those characteristics could be used in the analysis 
                                                 
386 National Network of Fusion Centers, 2015 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report 
(Washington, DC: National Network of Fusion Centers, 2016), 15, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did= 
796365. 
387 United States Department of Justice, Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion 
Centers: A Supplement to the Fusion Center Guidelines (Washington, DC: United States Department of 
Justice, 2008), 42–43, https://it.ojp.gov/documents/d/baseline%20capabilities%20for%20state%20and%20 
major%20urban%20area%20fusion%20centers.pdf. 
388 Ibid. 
389 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The Role of Fusion Centers: Countering Violent 
Extremism (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012), https://it.ojp.gov/ 
documents/roleoffusioncentersincounteringviolentextremism_compliant.pdf. 
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of an individual’s radicalization process and engagement and interventions facilitated 
through counter-radicalization programs. The analysis also suggests several pathways for 
future research on using SNA in the THIRA framework and other government efforts for 
countering terrorism and violent extremism.  
First, further research is needed to determine the level to which a community’s 
vulnerability and capability gaps, as revealed through the THIRA process, makes them of 
particular interest to the security community at the national level. Because the recent 
decrease in federal funding has been understood to have diminished the ability to 
facilitate and support a large number of interventions and engagement, targeting 
capabilities would need to be concentrated in specific areas. Each of the cases studied 
applied similar criteria to determine the focus of their outreach and support, and the 
federal government would need to determine criteria as well. The proposed THIRA 
process outlines several criteria that could help the targeting of capabilities for 
communities throughout America. Ultimately, states and localities should use their 
THIRA results to inform grant spending for strategically closing their capability gaps. 
The development of such criteria would require further research exploration regarding the 
use of SNA when assessing threats from, and prevention of, radicalized violence and 
whether this type of assessment supports a more cost-effective strategy. 
Second, further research has the potential to determine whether the utilization of 
SNA in the THIRA process will have positive effects in preventing an individual from 
radicalizing and adopting violent intentions. For example, would capabilities in the 
community to increase social capital decrease the likelihood of radicalization similar to of 
what occurred with Omar Hammami or isolated communities experiencing high rates of 
extremist violence, such as the Somali Diaspora communities in Minnesota.390 The case 
studies suggest that linkages exist between central actors, cohesive communities, and 
social support systems and the various factors that contribute to radicalization and 
increased or decreased vulnerability. If the use of SNA in the THIRA framework 
                                                 
390 Violent Extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America: Hearing before the Senate Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 4 (2009) (statement of Andrew Leipman, Deputy Director 
of Intelligence National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Directorate of Intelligence). 
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indicates positive effects longitudinally from intervention activities, further research is 
needed to measure how that information can lead to improving prevention efforts 
nationally and drive a change in policy direction to permit for a broader scope in 
mitigating the process of radicalization. 
Finally, although the SNA methodology in the THIRA process was designed to 
enhance a community’s assessment of vulnerabilities and capabilities, several aspects of 
the national assessment framework suggested in the literature and case studies that 
warrant additional review. Using SNA as a primary tool for assessment and strategy 
development is the basic recommendation emerging from this research; however, specific 
areas of academic research should also explore the use of simulations, such as system 
dynamics and agent-based modeling that could also inform effective solutions. 
C. NEXT STEPS 
The central points of this thesis are as follows: applying SNA for assessing threats 
of radicalization and violent extremism can be effective in making communities safer, 
and that the U.S. federal government can improve its national threat and risk assessment 
strategy by working with actors who are trusted and provide the most influence in a 
community. These points form the basis for a new THIRA process, a mechanism for 
federal and local agencies that can work to build trust and stronger support systems 
among the whole-of-community.  
To realize the new THIRA model, support is needed to create a unified, national 
CVE framework that focuses on the spread of ideology and its impacts, which is distinct 
from imminent threats of terrorism and its intersection with law enforcement. Because 
the communications from violent extremists are more ubiquitous than ever before, every 
state and community must be prepared to address the challenge of radicalization and 
violent extremism. While the cases studied in this thesis provide some examples of 
effective programs, at least one U.S. community would need to take the lead as a pilot 
program in testing SNA in the THIRA process. Successful implementation of an 
experimental case, particularly with a state or community with prior experience in 
conducting a THIRA, could make the case for national expansion, and ultimately initiate 
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an addendum to the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201 that outlines the four-step 
process for accountability of the threat and risk assessment framework. Such findings can 
address the need to align federal government efforts with individual cities and towns to 
establish a nationwide approach to CVE.  
The United States has already seen that predicting radicalization is difficult and 
efforts to disrupt the process are not always successful. The tactical approaches have thus 
far been largely effective, but they usually rely on identifying a threat just before it is 
carried out. Because the knowledge of someone who may have already been radicalized 
to commit violence is inherently limited, this approach may not always be successful. By 
developing a strategy that prevents an individual’s trajectory toward radicalization while 
it is still in early stages of development, however, homeland security and intelligence 
officials may be more effective in reducing a community’s overall vulnerability and 
increasing its resilience. A focus on social networks brings to light areas previously 
unexplored that may improve our fundamental understanding of the radicalization 
process and offer a road map for successful interventions in the future. 
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